
DR. SEBASTIAN GORKA
DEFEATING JIHAD
THE WINNABLE WAR

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"Concise, clear, and constructively combative, Dr. Gorka's book stands apart in its depth of understanding of Islamist terrorists and what their ultimate defeat demands of us. Above all, his defiance of political correctness makes this well-written, finely argued work of immediate practical value. The author has presented us with an inspiring defense not merely of intellectual integrity—so lacking among today's intelligentsia—but of our civilization."

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"Sebastian Gorka's trenchant new work, *Defeating Jihad,* employs a Cold War analogy to make blunt recommendations as to what is to be done about the existential threat of jihadism. Like George Kennan's 1946 'Long Telegram' analysis to the Truman administration of how to confront predatory communism, the foundation of Seb Gorka's strategy to destroy the jihadists is containment. Containment, however, was not by itself sufficient to destroy the Soviets, and it won't roll back and erase Al Qaeda and its kindred of Cain. Seb Gorka reminds us that there are three fundamental tactics that will hasten the defeat of the jihadists. First, speak candidly of the enemy. These are predators who preach a homicidal interpretation of Islam. Second, accept that the U.S. cannot do the fighting. The U.S. can only help those who defend themselves. Finally, educating ourselves about the enemy's point of view requires patience and resources, and gathering fresh intelligence on the enemy requires even more patience and money. 'Pay now or pay later.' To continue Seb Gorka's historical analogy of the Cold War to defeat the Soviets, at present we are at about 1949. The Berlin Crisis is behind us, and we have learned little about the nature of the enemy or about ourselves in conflict."

—John Batchelor, author and host of *The John Batchelor Show*

"Dr. Sebastian Gorka is one of the world's leading experts in asymmetric warfare. In *Defeating Jihad* you get a glimpse of why his opinion matters in councils of war and in academia. He combines the perceptive with the analytic, the piercing intellect with the grit of real-world experience."

—Stephen K. Bannon, executive chairman of Breitbart News

DEFEATING JIHAD

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THE WINNABLE WAR

DR. SEBASTIAN GORKA

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For Colonel Nick Pratt.
The truest warrior-scholar I ever met.

For the passengers of Flight 93, who fought and died to save total strangers.

For the two SEALs of Benghazi, Tyrone S. Woods and Glen Doherty.
Men ordered to stand down who instead ran toward the gunfire.

And to Pali and Zsuzsi.
For loving me and showing me why we fight.

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PROLOGUE

ONE MAN AND HIS CHOICES

I do not come to the question of America's role in the world unemotionally or in a simply clinical fashion. Like so many things in life, my attitude toward this issue and the current threat to America is shaped by history, the history of my family.

After the war between the Allies and the evil forces of Adolf Hitler's Nazi empire had devastated Budapest, the beautiful city of his birth, a teenager called Paul witnessed his "liberated" home being progressively taken over by the new totalitarian ideology of communism.

As he saw the stipulations of the Yalta conference—which was meant to shape the postwar world—flouted one by one, especially when it came to countries like his own being allowed to choose their own governments after the war, Paul decided to resist. As a fifteen-year-old boy he had fought with a submachine gun through the ruins of the Hungarian capital. But now, as a young man enrolled in university, his resistance to the new communist dictatorship would take an indirect and covert form.

Enrolled as an architectural student in the Technical University that still sits on the banks of the River Danube in the heart of Budapest, he decided that with hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops occupying Hungary and the political system rapidly becoming a one-party communist state, the best way to fight back would be by undermining Moscow's plans for dominating his beloved homeland and the whole region.

In college Paul secretly organized a small circle of Christian students whom he could trust, students who not only shared his strong faith but were prepared to risk their lives in order to make their country free and independent once more. The group would use their mandatory college internships to get placements at strategically important state enterprises, at locations such as railheads and industrial planning bureaus, which were key to Moscow's domination of the national economy of Hungary and the spread of the Kremlin's power across what would soon become the "Soviet bloc."

There the young men, pretending to help "the Party" solidify its grip on the nation and serve the spread of communism, would record convoy movements, the shipments of military supplies, and the measures taken to nationalize the key hubs of industry that the apparatchiks were making subservient to the Kremlin. They did so fully aware that if the Hungarian secret police or their masters in the KGB ever found out what they were doing, they would be arrested, interrogated, and most likely summarily executed.

As this small band of anticommunist patriots intensified their information-gathering activities, they established contact with Western intelligence, specifically MI6, the external spy service of Great Britain. Now the information about what the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was doing in Central Europe and how it was flagrantly in breach of the commitments it had made to its erstwhile allies at Yalta would reach a government that could actually use that information to subvert Moscow's plan to enslave countries such as Paul's beloved Hungary.

But he and his friends didn't realize the deadly danger they were putting themselves in by reaching out across the Iron Curtain to a government that they saw as a pillar of the free world.

Working through a courier who could move across the border between captive Hungary and free Austria, Paul and his team would send coded reports to London via Vienna. But one day in the spring of 1950, the courier was kidnapped off the streets of the Austrian capital, smuggled into Hungary, and dumped in the headquarters of the Hungarian secret police. The courier was eventually murdered, but not before his captors had tortured and interrogated him and uncovered the identities of the student spies, Paul included. Capturing the courier and identifying the band of

young anticommunists had been made easy by the treachery of a senior British spymaster.

Kim Philby, a member of the Cambridge Spy Ring, the most infamous band of Soviet double agents of the Cold War, had been at the end of the chain of intelligence reporting that went from Paul and his friends across Europe to the headquarters of His Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service. Ensconced at the heart of the British spy establishment, Philby and his treacherous comrades were in the perfect place to encourage the identification of anticommunist patriots behind the Iron Curtain, recruit them in the cause of freedom and democracy, and eventually betray them to the occupying Soviet forces or the indigenous secret police machinery. Here it should be noted that the treachery of Philby's spy ring was not limited to Hungary but reached across Central and Eastern Europe, and even to the Balkans, prepared as they were to sacrifice as many persons as necessary for the greater glory of Karl Marx and the utopia of communism.

Soon Paul and his friends were arrested. At the headquarters of the Hungarian secret police, Paul was tortured for weeks before being sentenced in a communist show trial, at the age of twenty, to life in prison.

Paul was my father.

Despite the horrendous torture that left this young athlete—Paul was on Hungary's national crew team set to row at the Olympics—injured for life, he was lucky. The government had decided before the trial that given his role in organizing the circle of secret patriots he must be hanged. That was how justice worked under communism, whether in Hungary, the USSR, or Mao's China. Sentences were determined before the trial even began. But unbeknownst to Paul, he had a guardian angel who would save him from the hangman's noose.

Today in Hungary, a beautiful country almost fully recovered from the decades of communism, my family name is associated with one person in particular, Geza Gorka, my father's uncle, a ceramicist and one of Hungary's most famous twentieth-century artists. He was also a canny survivor with remarkable political sense. In the turbulent world of Central Europe in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, his work was sought after by collectors of every political stripe and regime, no matter which ideology they followed.

In the years after World War I, which had deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its population, Geza's work found favor with the government of regent Admiral Horthy and the vestiges of the Austro-Hungarian nobility and gentry who ran the country. After the Second World War, despite having been favored by the "enemies of the People," his artwork was prized by Budapest's new communist overlords. So much so that many a visiting head of state or other dignitary received a Gorka vase as an official gift from the Politburo or the general secretary himself.

When the nationally celebrated artist heard that his favorite nephew had been arrested, and most probably for acts of treason against the communist state, he swung into action. Behind the scenes, very quietly, Geza Gorka reached out to the highest levels of the regime. He knew the Party's attitude: the people had to see that betrayal of the Marxist system would be crushed. But perhaps Paul could be spared the death penalty.

The reach of the artist was indeed long enough. Geza was told that though his nephew must be made an example of, in light of his youth and his uncle's service to the regime, he would be given a prison sentence of "only" ten years. Little did my father or his uncle know that even now, in negotiating a secret deal, the regime was lying.

Forty years later, after the communist regimes of the region had fallen, we would be allowed to see the original secret files pertaining to my father's arrest, interrogation, and sentencing. Now declassified, there is one document that perfectly demonstrates the nature of totalitarianism and how a communist regime worked in reality. Written before my father had even appeared in court, it was stamped by the secret police: SUBJECT NOT TO BE RELEASED EVEN AFTER SERVING HIS SENTENCE. Not only was daily life in a communist state built publicly upon lies, even behind the curtains of totalitarian power, the socialist state was suffused with deception.

So my father was tried and the prepared sentence delivered by the judge: ten years in prison for the crime of treason against the Socialist People's Republic of Hungary. But even after a decade he was to be kept in political prison. Until he died.

My father began serving his sentence under particularly punitive conditions. Perhaps to counter the "favor" that Uncle Geza had managed to

extract from his political connections, Paul was to spend the first two years of his incarceration in solitary confinement. In most penal systems, solitary confinement is seen as a temporary measure, meted out for a week or two in response to some infraction of the prison rules. Under communism, solitary was a way to send a message to the enemies of the state that though they were already in prison, the authorities could always make matters worse. It was another way to show that the state had total capricious control and could punish whenever it wanted and for any reason. (Although I am his flesh and blood, to this day I cannot comprehend, for even a moment, what two years alone in a prison cell without contact with the outside world was like for my father. And I still absolutely cannot comprehend how this treatment by itself, let alone the torture he was subjected to, failed to have a permanent effect on my father's mind.)

After solitary, my father was released into the general population of political prisoners, among whom he would meet the cream of anticommunist Hungarian society, other patriots imprisoned for their love of freedom and resistance to dictatorship. Priests, professors, leaders of Christian organizations as innocuous as the YMCA, and politicians who had dared to challenge the lies of the Communist Party in what they had believed would be democratic elections at the end of the war.

My father called these years the best "university" anyone could ever attend. One day he would be learning about economics or engineering from men who had worked at the highest levels of the pre-communist government. The next he would be educated in mathematics or philosophy by professors who had been punished simply for being members of the middle class. Then the following day, as they circled the prison yard for their mandatory daily walk, he would imbibe the wisdom of the many old-school Catholic and Protestant clergymen who had been imprisoned simply for believing in God and being men of the cloth. But it was still an education within a prison. And not just a standard prison, but a prison for "enemies of the state."

Then came the next change.

Given his youth and his strength as a former athlete, my father, along with other able-bodied inmates, was offered a choice: stay among the general population of political prisoners with all that entailed or volunteer for hard manual labor in a prison coal mine.

Already the cost of communism was beginning to show in the national economy. With the law of supply and demand repealed as an expression of capitalist dogma, the nation was not producing as the Party's five-year plan demanded. The workforce was physically incapable of meeting the production targets needed for communism to flourish everywhere in the East, not just in Hungary. Socialism would never defeat the "rabid dogs" of the democratic West unless more healthy bodies could be applied to the task.

The deal was simple. In return for becoming a manual laborer serving the state, Paul and any other political prisoners who joined him would enjoy perks not available to the other prisoners. Chief among these was better food and more of it. (This can hardly be called a "perk," of course, since it would be pointless to press prisoners into manual labor and not feed them adequately for their task. Hungry slave labor is weak slave labor, and weak slave labor will make reaching the ideologically mandatory industrial targets impossible!)

In exchange for these "concessions," however, each prisoner would be required to dig ten tons of coal a day without machinery or explosives. Realizing he was physically a shadow of his former self and that coal mining was the closest thing to exercise he was going to get, my father accepted the deal.

But more important, he knew that working in a mine would bring him into daily contact with people from the outside. None of the prisoners knew anything about mining coal, so the shafts and seams were also manned by civilian miners, who had access to contraband and could communicate with relatives and loved ones. Most important of all, working in a mine, with access to tools, was a chance to escape.

Paul actually enjoyed his two years underground as a manual laborer. Originally the Gorkas had been *vojvodas,* members of the Polish aristocracy who had ended up in Hungary after the revolutionary turmoil of 1848. Before World War II, his own family had been comfortably positioned at the upper levels of the middle class, his father, Augustus, a bank manager and successful athlete himself, having represented the country as a long-distance runner. Now in the prison mines of Hungary, Paul developed a new appreciation for the working class of his beloved nation. Not the idealized "workers" of communist propaganda, but the sort of men who are the

hardworking backbone of any nation, providing the staples and the foundation upon which the country is built. Handful by handful, wheelbarrowful by wheelbarrowful, the former student of architecture and fine arts tore from the earth with his pickaxe the coal that would fuel the furnaces and boilers of national industry.

After two years, however, the communist state had another problem, subtler but just as serious. In its ideological purge of Hungarian society, targeting not only the former aristocracy and political elite but above all the anticommunists of the middle class, the Communist Party had destroyed the intellectual capacity of the country.

People like my father and his older compatriots were the architects, engineers, and other professionals who constituted the level between the manual laborer and the government, the educated men who guided industry and helped the country flourish. With so many of the professional class in prison or executed for having resisted communism, the nation was simply failing to function. The Party's attempted solution illustrates the perfectly absurd contradictions inherent in Karl Marx's utopian vision.

Marx had taught that the modern capitalist state was doomed, built as it was on the exploitation of the workers by industrialists and the middle class. The coming revolution would destroy the capitalists and middle classes, leaving only the working class and the Party. But now, just six years after Hungary had been taken over in the name of the workers, the country was falling behind. Quotas were not being met, and the vision of the eventual "workers' paradise" was slipping further and further away. What was to be done? There was only one group of people with the requisite skills to realize the vision of Marx and Lenin: the surviving members of the bourgeoisie who were in prison.

In desperation, the Party organized industrial offices inside its political prisons and manned them with the people who with their training and expertise had been supporting and running the companies of the free market before the communists had taken over and arrested them. Practically Pythonesque, this solution saw the imprisoned enemies of the state, who had helped build the system that socialism was predicated on destroying, press-ganged into saving the economy from the incompetence and ideological dead end that was communism.

Because of his initial training as an architect, my father had to trade in his pick for a draftsman's pen. He was moved to the Central Prison, outside Budapest, where an engineers' office had been set up in the political prisoners' wing. Here he would work as a prisoner-draftsman, supplying one of the technical skills that the one-party state's command economy was in desperately short supply of.

In his new office, Paul befriended an older man who had been imprisoned for being a member of the postwar government and a leader of the YMCA. This pillar of pre-communist Hungary, an elegant and handsome man named George, had a wife and young daughters who were now fending for themselves. One day George asked a favor. If ever Paul made it out of prison, would he please help his daughters escape to the West, away from the depredations and soul-destroying nihilism of communist life? Though my father was convinced that he would end his days behind bars, he assured George that should he ever make it out alive, he would gladly locate his daughters and escape to freedom in the West.

Then in the fall of 1956, the world turned upside down. Just for ten days, but it turned upside down.

In response to anticommunist strikes and protests in Soviet-occupied East Germany and communist Poland, a group of Hungarian students from Paul's old university decided to hold a silent vigil in solidarity with those resisting the Marxist oppression elsewhere. On October 23, they gathered at the statue of a Polish national hero that stood proudly on the bank of the Danube in downtown Budapest.

The number of students at the vigil grew and grew, and they collectively decided to cross the Danube and approach the headquarters of Hungarian state radio. As the crowd of silent marchers traversed the capital, the city's residents opened their windows and stepped out onto their balconies waving the red, green, and white national flag in support. Not the flag of the communist state, with the hammer and wheatsheaf in the center, but the plain tricolor of a free Hungary, the communist emblem hurriedly torn out of the middle.

A nation was awakening. A people was rising as one to face and fight the totalitarians.

Thus began the ten days of the Hungarian Revolution. The students were joined by the workers from the factories on Csepel Island in the

Danube, laborers who had had enough of seeing the machinery and goods they produced shipped off to Russia, as the Party stewards repeatedly increased the mandatory production norms to inhuman levels while they themselves enjoyed all the privileges and luxuries that being a party flunky afforded them.

When the student protestors, their ranks swelled by the revolutionary "working class," reached the radio headquarters, they demanded access to the studios to broadcast their list of impromptu demands, which included the withdrawal of all Soviet occupational forces from Hungarian territory and a free and fair election with a secret ballot.

It was here that the full force of history was unleashed. Secret police inside the building suddenly opened fire on the unarmed protestors, and the freedom-loving Hungarian people realized that the time had come. Soon anticommunist elements in the armed forces supplied arms to the revolutionaries and even fought on their side. The streets of Budapest became a barricade-littered battlefield, the forces of freedom pitched against the legions of the totalitarian oppressor. Hungarian students had been forced in recent years to attend Party-mandated infantry-skills classes so that they would be ready for any war with the "degenerate" West, and the well-trained young revolutionaries now won street battle after street battle.

It was at this point that the freedom fighters captured a tank from the Russians who were reinforcing the Hungarian Communist Party. The new revolutionary commander of the captured tank decided that rather than use his new weapon to attack the regime, he would liberate those who had suffered the most under the Stalinist dictatorship. The revolutionaries drove the Soviet tank to the national prison, where my father was incarcerated, and stormed it. Crashing through the gates, the freedom fighters flooded in to arrest the warders or kill those servants of the communist state who would not surrender. And so it was that my father was liberated by his fellow patriots during the precious few days when Hungary broke from Moscow and the tyranny of socialist oppression.

Soon a revolutionary cabinet was formed and negotiations were initiated with the weakened communist regime on the "neutral" territory of the Yugoslav embassy. The plan was for Hungary to break from Moscow's control and force the removal of the thousands of Soviet troops and tanks that had been stationed in Hungary since the end of the war.

But then the revolution was betrayed.

Those negotiating on behalf of a free Hungary were kidnapped from the embassy grounds with the complicity of Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav dictator, and Moscow deployed hundreds of tanks and thousands of troops from the territory of Ukraine and Rumania into Hungary as reinforcements for the regime, crushing the fledging democratic government and taking back by force that which they could not have any other way.

My father was already with his widowed mother when the Soviets reinvaded. As he followed the freedom fighters' tragic reversal, he was informed by a relative with a connection in the Ministry of the Interior that his name was on a shoot-to-kill list with other escaped "reactionary elements." If found, he would not simply be arrested and sent back to solitary confinement; he would be shot there and then.

With no choice but to leave the country of his birth, he remembered the promise he had made to his prison mate about his daughters. Presenting himself at the family's door, he announced that he was going to escape to the West and that the daughters could come with him. Two of them did: the eldest, a tall seventeen-year-old named Susan, and her younger sister Elizabeth. With only the clothes on their backs and enough money to make it to the Austrian border, the three left Budapest just as the forces of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Hungary were reestablishing their grip on the nation.

Elizabeth, who suffered from polio, had to turn back as the days grew colder and the journey more arduous. (Eventually she too would escape, accompanied to the West by my father's best friend from his years in prison.) After avoiding the police and roving military patrols, Susan and my father made it to the border. But not knowing how to make it across the minefield laid by the Hungarian security forces along the border, they had to give the very last of their money—and my father's gold watch, which had belonged to his father—to a local farmer, who revealed the path to safety through the mines.

Finally, after being betrayed, tortured, and imprisoned for almost a quarter of his life, my father made it to freedom and an Austrian refugee camp. Not knowing that he and his band of friends had been betrayed by a British counteragent, he told the authorities at the refugee camp that he wished to be settled in England.

As you may have guessed, Paul married Susan, who became my mother. I was born and raised in England, but I grew up a proud Hungarian. More important than that, I was brought up to understand one thing without question: freedom is fragile. Freedom is not the natural state of affairs, and there will always be those who believe they have the right to take your freedom from you to serve their "greater" ideological cause.

A NEW TOTALITARIANISM

I am a child of the Cold War. The 1970s and 1980s shaped who I am today, the backdrop of the Hungarian Revolution providing clarity as to what was at stake. To quote the great Ronald Reagan, the loss of freedom is always just one generation away.

For me the pronouncements of communists were not just empty words. I could tell the price of their "workers' paradise" from the scars that the secret police had left on my father's wrists when they hung him backward from hooks in the ceiling of their torture chamber. The endless speeches from the likes of Brezhnev, Andropov, or even the "reformer" Gorbachev about the glorious tomorrow that socialism would bring brought to mind the names of my father's friends who had been executed for their "crimes against the state" in the internal courtyard of the Central Prison.

Today I am a proud American, blessed with a beautiful family and the honor of working with my wife in support of the peace officers and warfighters who protect this greatest of nations on God's earth. As an immigrant who chose to become an American and the son of parents who had to fight for their freedom, I understand 9/11 differently from those for whom the threat of totalitarianism is purely abstract.

Man is made in the image of his Creator. It is this reflection of God that imbues us with inherent value and dignity. The soul that each of us carries isn't simply an expression of who he is or the eternal embodiment of his identity. It is the building block of our civilization. Judeo-Christian civilization is based upon the idea that the innate dignity of the individual, derived from his being made in God's image, must be the central value of human society. Man is man because God made him, and he is ultimately fulfilled only through the relationship he has with his Creator.

When men make themselves the arbiters of truth and the guarantors of (earthly) salvation, they sow the ideological seeds of tyranny. That ideology may make the state the object of worship and racial purity the goal of society, as with fascism and Nazism, or it may insist that class conflict is the engine of history and that collective control of the material "means of production" is the key to human flourishing, as with communism. In either case, the individual has no rights, and the totalitarian control of all by a self-appointed elite becomes the only way to "ensure" the perfection of humankind. Man is enslaved by his fellow man for the "greater" good of some utopia.

The Third Reich was the dream of one man, Adolf Hitler, a "thousand-year Reich" that would dominate the world. But it was about this terrestrial reality, eschewing as the Nazi ideology did the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western civilization. There were no gods, the state was to be worshipped instead, along with the Führer, who was the embodiment of the state. Blood and treasure were to be expended in order to build the empire, to secure the master race's *Lebensraum* and subjugate or destroy the *Untermensch.*

Given the events in Hitler's Berlin bunker before the end of the war, it is now clear that he was a fanatic who eventually lost all sight of the reality on the ground and could never countenance that his plan had failed. But once he and his closest henchmen had died at their own hands, it was a matter of just moments for the rest of the military leadership to surrender to the Allies, for them to realize the war was over. The project had failed; there was no more to be done. The West had defeated Hitler's race-based totalitarianism. It was close. But we won.

The same is true for the communist threat that America faced for more than forty years. The Kremlin may have blustered about shouldering any burden and paying any price to win the ideological war with their "capitalist enemies," but the brutality of the Soviet system was not built on blind fanaticism. If it had been, then the policy of mutually assured destruction could never have worked.

Once the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union realized that there was no way for Moscow to launch a first-strike nuclear attack against America and the West without our being able to retaliate with our own nuclear arsenal in such a way that Russia would be devastated, the idea of nuclear war became unconscionable. The communist elite had no

desire to die just to teach the "capitalist pigs" a lesson. They may not have loved freedom, but at the end of the day, they wanted to live, and eventually we defeated them and demonstrated the illegitimacy of their ideology.

Today, our enemy is very different.

Today, as a nation we face a new totalitarianism, one that is potentially even more dangerous than fascism or communism. Today's threat is *hybrid totalitarianism* that goes beyond man-made justifications for perfecting society along politically defined lines and instead uses the religion of Islam and Allah to justify mass murder.

Our enemy today is again a totalitarian. I call it the global jihadist movement. The members of this movement, be they Al Qaeda, ISIS, or Hizbollah, have a vision of the future world that is exclusive and absolutist. Either the whole planet is under their control or they have lost. There is no middle ground. No peaceful coexistence is possible. Ever. The infidel must submit or be killed.

But the center of the enemy's ideology today is not a state. In fact, the enemy totally rejects the idea of the state as an invention of the infidel West. Nor is its ideology concerned with class distinctions, economics, or "the means of production." Today our enemy fights not for earthly reasons to serve a tangible here-and-now but to serve a transcendent reality, to serve Allah.

But in their absolutist "them or us" attitude, they bear a great resemblance to the Nazis and communists of yesteryear, and that is why I am writing this book.

I grew up in freedom in the United Kingdom. Today I am a proud American, but I will never forget what my father taught me. Freedom is as precious as it is fragile. If you are complacent, there will always eventually come a group that will try to take your freedom away from you by violence and through the subversion of your values.

Every generation must remain vigilant. Each generation must make a conscious decision to protect what we have achieved as a civilization and be prepared to fight—if necessary to the death—to save our loved ones and our children from enslavement to the newest dictatorial ideology, secular or religious.

I grew up knowing these truths in my bones, so as I watched the horrific events of 9/11 unfold live on a television screen, it did not take very long

for me to understand one thing: the totalitarians are back. This time the dictatorship invokes the name of God, as opposed to the working class or the Führer, but they are back, and they will either kill us or enslave us.

This book is born out of the belief that we Americans can defeat the new totalitarians and that their defeat should be built on the secret plan that America used to defeat our last totalitarian enemy, communism.

In fact, you can argue that our current enemy predates even fascism and communism and that we have been at war with the jihadists since at least the Barbary Wars of the eighteenth century.

Perhaps now is the time for us to have a strategy to defeat them. This book is the first cut of that plan.

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after World War II, a young diplomat called George Kennan was sitting in the American embassy in Moscow when a simple request came in from Washington: Explain to us what the USSR is doing and why it is behaving as it is. Kennan's response, an unusually long secret telegram to the secretary of state, would shape U.S. foreign and security policy for the next forty years.

Washington was perplexed and stymied. Joseph Stalin, "Uncle Joe," had been a stalwart ally whose forces had been essential to the defeat of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. But just a few months after the fall of Berlin, the Soviets were acting like new belligerents, not friends, obstructing America and the rest of the Allies and undermining the postwar arrangements agreed upon by all the victors at Yalta, Potsdam, and Tehran. Had the Kremlin changed, or did Washington simply not understand the way Stalin and the Politburo looked at the world? Washington needed an answer, and George Kennan, a professionally trained expert in Russian history and culture, was the perfect man to provide it.

Published in a redacted and revised pseudonymous version a year later in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Kennan's analysis of our nascent Cold War enemy was a masterpiece. He skillfully explained how the "personality" of the Kremlin was formed by the absolutist and totalitarian ideology of communism, which had created what would later be called a "slave state." And the

ideology that drove this slave state would simply not allow it to coexist with America and the other Western democracies.

Kennan's analysis became the basis not only for America's later "containment" policy—the plan to protect the West from the threat of communism that President Truman eventually announced to a joint session of Congress in 1947—but also for National Security Council Report NSC-68, the top-secret White House plan to defeat Soviet Russia, a plan that would result, forty years later, in the fall of the Berlin Wall and victory in the Cold War.

The "Long Telegram," as Kennan's work came to be known, and NSC-68 together are a casebook study in what the military and intelligence community call an enemy threat doctrine analysis and a grand strategic response plan.

America lacks such a threat doctrine analysis for our post-9/11 world. Despite more than a decade's worth of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are unsure how to win our war against global jihad. The purpose of this book is to provide today's "long telegram" and to formulate a strategic plan to defeat the new totalitarians.

FROM COMMUNISM TO JIHAD

At first it may seem peculiar to just dust off one war plan—and a "cold" one at that—and apply it to today's threat. But this isn't simply an unimaginative exercise in repetition. To begin with, understanding how we analyzed that threat and eventually defeated it is a valuable exercise in itself. Few people know anything about how America really planned the fall of communism in the 1950s and how far-ranging and sophisticated a strategy we had right at the beginning of the Cold War.

Secondly, the similarities between the threat we faced then and the threat we face now are numerous and remarkably deep, and therefore it is all the more important to know what we did as a nation at the start of the Cold War and how we can profit from it today in the post-9/11 world.

Later we will look in more detail at how the Long Telegram and NSC-68 should shape the plan to destroy our jihadist enemies today, but for now consider this passage from Kennan's original secret cable:

> In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi[,] that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken. . . .

Kennan was writing about the USSR, but this description of a fanatical enemy incapable of living in peace with America applies word for word to the jihadist organizations behind all the major terrorist atrocities from 9/11 to the San Bernardino massacre.

Kennan's original analysis had a critical effect on the U.S. government's strategic response to the threat of global communism for decades to come. After answering Washington's question about the nation's new enemy, Kennan returned to Washington, gave a series of lectures at the National War College, and turned the secret cable into the article for *Foreign Affairs* (published under the name "Mr. X") that would shape the Cold War.

Internally, his analysis became the foundation of the administration's public and covert response to the Kremlin. In 1947, President Truman declared to Congress, the American people, and the world that communism must be contained and that the United States would assist any group of people threatened by the Kremlin or local communist forces, beginning with Greece. Two years later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, and in 1950 the United States went to war to stop the communist takeover of the Korean peninsula. But an analysis of the new enemy and an overt declaration of our intent to stop communism was not enough. A detailed, classified, long-term plan for ultimate victory was needed. And this is where Paul Nitze joins our story.

THE SECRET PLAN TO DEFEAT THE SOVIETS

Nitze, the director of policy planning in President Truman's State Department, would go on to a prestigious career serving administration after administration, eventually rising to assistant secretary of defense under President Gerald Ford and cofounding the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

In January 1950, Truman tasked the State Department and the Department of Defense "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." As a result, the State-Defense Policy Review Group was established under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze.

The final fifty-eight-page top-secret strategy, NSC-68, was eventually declassified in the 1970s by Henry Kissinger, and so today we can see exactly how our nation understood the threat of communism at the start of the Cold War and what our plan to defeat it actually was.

It is obvious that Kennan's cable informed Nitze and his team. In the very first section of NSC-68 they write:

> [U]nlike previous aspirants to hegemony, [the USSR] is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or nonviolent methods. . . .

The "design" of the communist masters of the Kremlin requires "the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority" and calls for

> the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. . . . The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

Despite its obvious debt to the Long Telegram, NSC-68 does much more than simply reiterate Kennan's analysis of the existential threat that the Soviet Union represented to the free world.

WHAT IT TOOK TO WIN THEN. WHAT IT TAKES TO WIN NOW

In the pantheon of military thinkers and grand strategists, two giants stand out: the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz and the Chinese master Sun Tsu.

Clausewitz's posthumously published work *On War,* shaped by the age of Napoleonic warfare, is best known for the concept of the friction and the fog of war and the "Clausewitzian dictum" that war is but the continuation of politics by other means. Clausewitz is still taught at military academies and war colleges across the globe, and his theories continue to inform how military men and women think about war in the twenty-first century.

Just as famous, if not more so, is the ancient Asian sage Sun Tsu, author of *The Art of War*. Sun Tsu is a much easier and quicker read than Clausewitz, full of short pieces of advice, from the tactical to the strategic, that have been quoted and applied far beyond the military, often in the world of business. The adage most frequently attributed to Sun Tsu—"know your enemy if you wish to win"—is actually a misquotation. It is indeed good to know your enemy if you wish to win, but Sun Tsu's recipe for ultimate victory begins with knowing *yourself*—why you are going to war, what you are fighting for. You may have studied the culture and ways of your foe for years and be intimately familiar with his thinking, but first you must be able to answer the questions, What do I represent? What am I prepared to risk blood and treasure for, and why exactly am I going to war? If you cannot answer these questions, then you should not be going to war at all.

And these are the questions that we Americans have not adequately answered since that dreadful Tuesday morning in 2001. In the beginning it was clear enough: we were going to war to crush those responsible for the largest terrorist attack in modern history and to destroy Al Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan. But then we stayed in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq came next, and the clarity we had in the days after 9/11 was replaced with confusion, obfuscation, and what the Washington set euphemistically calls "mission creep."

Not so at the onset of our last war with a totalitarian enemy. Thanks to Truman, Nitze, and NSC-68, America knew what it stood for as a nation

and why it had to defeat the communists.

Nitze clearly had read his Sun Tsu, or he at least intuitively knew that expert knowledge of the enemy like Kennan's was an insufficient platform upon which to construct a war plan. He knew that we could win against a vicious absolutist ideology only if we knew what we represented as a nation and what was therefore at stake. His top-secret strategy to defeat the Soviets opens with a discussion of matters that are in no way secret. Referring to facts about the American founding recounted in any schoolbook, Nitze declares that "the fundamental purpose of the United States" is "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual."

Paul Nitze fully understood that a communist Russia, which by this time had acquired nuclear weapons, represented an existential threat to the United States of America and the values enshrined in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence. He and his team went on to lay out the strategic options available, identify the only feasible course, and explain how to navigate it. NSC-68 supplied the details of how America could strengthen its allies and partners, promote democracy in general, limit the spread of communism, and weaken the grip of the Kremlin from within. We will look at those details later. Suffice it to say now that the plan was right and the plan worked. Eventually the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. And all without a shot being fired across Checkpoint Charlie.

In the Cold War we faced a totalitarian enemy committed to a "them or us" view of the world. The same is true today, except that, unlike our old atheist enemy, our new foe fights us for the glory of Allah.

Fifteen years into this competition to the death, we need a new Long Telegram, a clear-eyed analysis of what our enemy believes and an understanding of how those beliefs inform his actions. Only when we understand the enemy as he understands himself will we be able to craft a new NSC-68 to defeat the global jihadists just as we defeated the USSR.

As Kennan wrote in his original secret cable:

> Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same

> determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which [a] doctor studies [an] unreal and unreasonable individual.

But before we clinically dissect the beliefs and the resultant strategy of today's enemy, so as to arrive at a place where we can draw a plan to defeat him, we must first look in the mirror and diagnose the failures of our response to 9/11.

CHAPTER 1

THE WAR SO FAR

We are a nation at war. Or at least we should be, because there are large numbers of deeply committed people in the world who wish to see us all dead or enslaved.

America stands for something unique. It is the only nation to have been established around an idea, not an ethnicity, language, or dynastic fiefdom, and it will always have enemies who disagree with that idea. And that founding concept is liberty and the freedom of the individual.

Other nations are the result of national identities established over centuries. Identities based upon a shared ethnic heritage, or simply the accident of being established on the territory of a preexisting political monopoly.

America was born in direct opposition to "power by decree," under which an unelected elite exercised unaccountable control over the people. America was an idea formed in the crucible of a monarchy's arrogating the sovereignty of its citizens, the colonists of British North America. The American Revolution was defined by the idea that it wasn't the happenstance of being born into the correct family or class which secured your membership in a governing elite. Government was recognized by the Founding Fathers as an expression of the will of the people, not the caprice of an unrepresentative elite.

And anyone can be an American. Membership of the Republic does not depend on whether you belong to a special group but on whether you share and respect the values enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. The values expressed in these documents created America and made it the mightiest nation the world has ever seen—more powerful than the ancient Greeks, more powerful than the Roman Empire, more powerful even than the British Empire.

But this power hasn't brought safety and security.

In part because of the values upon which the nation was founded and in part because evil always prowls the earth, America is anathema to those who follow false gods or those who believe in their own power to define and monopolize truth here on earth or in the hereafter. Just look at the history of the last hundred years. First it was Nazis who wished to create a global empire in which the individual was just a cog in the machine of a state that worshipped racial purity and the glorious Führer. Then there were the Marxists and the communists, who replaced the Aryan race with the working class, but who again saw freedom and individual liberty as a threat to the power of the "enlightened" elite.

Sixty million people were killed in the war that followed the Third Reich's invasion of Poland. More than one hundred million souls were extinguished by communists between 1917 and 1989, from the gulags of the Soviet Union to the killing fields of Cambodia. The only nation that could put a stop to the totalitarianism of Berlin and then Moscow was the United States.

In the case of Hitler's Third Reich, the victory was won on the battlefields of Europe, in the deserts of North Africa, and in the jungles of Asia. In the case of the USSR, it took the bipartisan application of the policy of containment, the delegitimizing of the ideology of communism, and the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy to bring down the Iron Curtain. But it took just a generation for a new globally ambitious totalitarianism to establish itself as the greatest threat to democracy and target us as the bastion of individual freedom and liberty. That new hybrid totalitarianism was global jihad.

ONLY AMERICA

On the beautifully sunny day of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, the jihadists of Al Qaeda managed to do something that neither Hitler nor Stalin had ever achieved. In less than two hours they massacred almost three thousand innocent men, women, and children on American soil, including members of our armed forces working inside the Pentagon. Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, is said to have bellowed at the American people, "We will bury you!" But the Soviets never buried us. The new totalitarians, the Islamic terrorists of Al Qaeda, succeeded in doing so in Washington, New York, and Pennsylvania. And so our world changed.

As I write, we have entered the fifteenth year of our war with global jihadism, making this the longest war America has ever fought. We have lost thousands of our brave servicemen and women in faraway campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet our nation is still not safe. While our intelligence community tracked down Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and our special operators killed him in one of the most daring raids in military history, Americans are still dying in attacks on U.S. soil, from the Boston Marathon bombing to the San Bernardino Christmas party massacre. And now we face an even deadlier threat in the form of the jihadi insurgency that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS), which now controls territory in Iraq and Syria and has affiliates in more than a dozen countries from the Middle East to Africa and even Asia.

My first motivation in writing this book is the reality that America's strategic response to this new existential threat is failing. And believe me, it is an existential threat. The global jihadist movement may not yet have tank divisions at its disposal as did the Nazi regime or thousands of nuclear weapons as did the Soviets, but it has something much more important: a religious fervor combined with an un-Western degree of patience that produces a lethal and unbelievably resilient commitment to its cause. And the jihadists will not be negotiated with. For this enemy it truly is a question of "them or us." They will not be stopped unless someone stops them.

I am also writing this book because I am now a proud American who believes that no other nation can defeat the global jihadist movement. Whatever your politics, ask yourself one question: Whom do you trust to fight this fight if we don't? France? Germany? China? North Korea? Russia?

Our European allies simply do not have the ability to do what is required, even if they had the will to do so—which they do not. In light of the resolve he has shown in Syria, many see Vladimir Putin as the answer. But ask yourself another question: Is Vladimir Putin, a former KGB colonel who spent his pre-political career plotting to subvert and destroy us, moving into the Middle East because he believes in the values upon which America was founded?

Once again, America is the only answer to a globally ambitious and capable totalitarian threat. But is it just a matter of redeploying the Eighty-Second Airborne and sending U.S. troops into harm's way overseas? The past fourteen years would seem to be an argument against our using large-scale military operations against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or insurgents like the Islamic State. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started under George W. Bush's administration with the names Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom may have removed the Taleban and Saddam Hussein, but they have not led to a victory over the jihadists or the increased safety of our citizens back home. On the contrary.

As I write, America is witnessing the greatest increase in domestic jihadist plots and attacks since September 11, 2001. From a free speech rally in Garland, Texas, to a recruiting office in Chattanooga, Tennessee; from an office Christmas party in San Bernardino, California, to the attempted assassination of a police officer in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the global appeal of the jihadist message is being turned into horrific violence against Americans, not to mention the scores of deadly attacks in Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and Africa.

At the same time, ISIS has displaced Al Qaeda as the brand leader of global jihadism and succeeded where Osama bin Laden and all other previous jihadi groups have failed: It has reestablished the theocratic empire of Islam. It has founded the new caliphate.

Why are we still fighting this war more than a decade later, and why are we losing? We defeated the Nazis in less than five years, yet the global war on terror is now in its fifteenth year. How can America, a country of unprecedented military power, not yet have vanquished this new deadly religious totalitarianism?

The answer to this burning question has many elements, the most obvious one being that we have applied the wrong strategy since 9/11. But

the most important reasons go beyond not having the right plan of action and have instead to do with politics and ideology.

NAMING THE ENEMY

Our nation's immediate response to the attacks of September 2001 was to declare a "global war on terror." Yet this wasn't actually a war, nor was it global. It may seem a pedantic point, but the law defines war as protracted armed conflict between two or more nations. Al Qaeda is not a nation, nor is it a signatory to the Hague or Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. Our troops, therefore, were contending with a new threat that had very little to do with the system established in the twentieth century to regulate the use of force in international conflict. Nor did America apply itself "globally" to the mission of eradicating all terrorism. We did not deploy our special operators or CIA paramilitary forces to "take down" the Basque separatists of Spain, the ecoterrorists in the forests of Canada, or the Naxalite Marxist terrorists of India. We focused instead on a specific threat group, which we seemed unwilling to call what it called itself—jihadists, or holy warriors of Islam.

The sensitivities were clear. Originally, President Bush did not want to give the impression that America was at war with a religion. Nor did he want to alienate our Muslim allies. This was despite the fact that our Muslim partners, such as the Jordanians and the Egyptians, knew full well how Al Qaeda was using religion to fuel its war against not only the West but Muslims who disagreed with its vision of a theocratic future. Unfortunately, this distortion of reality would only increase over time until it reached outlandish and surreal proportions under President Barack Obama.

Under the bumper-sticker slogan of "global war," our brave fighters joined battle with Al Qaeda and its hosts, the Taleban regime of Afghanistan. In a stunning series of operations starting in October 2001, a handful of CIA personnel and U.S. special operations forces leveraged the Taleban's domestic enemies, the Northern Alliance, and not only destroyed Osama bin Laden's terror bases in Afghanistan but deposed the Taleban government in Kabul.

MISSION CREEP

However unfavorable your impression of the military endeavors that followed the fall of the Taleban, the initial operations in the winter of 2001 were a truly masterly example of "unconventional warfare." As the Green Berets like to say, we should try to achieve America's objectives "by, with, and through" the local friendly forces. And this is exactly what we did at the end of 2001 with just a handful of men in uniform on the ground. But after that fabulous initial success, the mission mutated, accelerated, and expanded in ways that would not be good for America or its citizens.

Once the Taleban fell, it was decided that that wasn't enough. Very soon the mission expanded from punishing or destroying those responsible for the original 9/11 attacks into what was called "nation building." Afghanistan would become home to tens of thousands of American and NATO and non-NATO troops, and the country would be molded into the shape of a modern country with a representative government and human rights for all. This despite the fact that Afghanistan, which had been at war for more than a generation, was made up of dozens of competing tribes and ethnic groups that had foiled similar grandiose and foreign plans over the centuries, from those of Alexander the Great to those of the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

But these realities were pushed aside. President Bush's advisors were confident: Afghanistan would be made into a modern nation that never again would harbor the likes of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist cadre. Then came the next war.

Key members of the Bush administration, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, had been involved in the first Gulf War back in 1990–1991. Many of them thought that war had not been concluded properly. The decision by the first President Bush not to decapitate the Iraqi regime and remove Saddam Hussein after his forces had been ejected from Kuwait had been a mistake, according to these members of his son's administration. And now, after 9/11, the reality of mass-casualty terrorism was no longer just a hypothetical.

Al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan had been destroyed, but bin Laden had escaped. Should he wish to attack the United States once more and kill even more innocent Americans, what better way than to use some type of

weapon of mass destruction (WMD)? And the Bush cabinet knew that Saddam Hussein had WMD capability. What if Al Qaeda could lay its hands on Iraq's chemical weapons, smuggle them into the United States, and use them in Boston or Los Angeles or Washington, D.C.?

THE LESSONS OF IRAQ

This is not the place to relitigate the question of Al Qaeda and Iraqi WMD, but I must make three points before we finish our review of what happened after 9/11. First, it was reasonable to conclude that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Second, it was reasonable to expect a certain amount of cooperation between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda. But, third, Saddam was nevertheless unlikely to share WMD with Al Qaeda.

Saddam Hussein was a bad man, and one of the reasons he was so bad was that he *did* have weapons of mass destruction and he *used* them against his own citizens. It is remarkable that even today otherwise reasonable people will parrot the line "Bush lied, people died," as if George W. Bush and his team knowingly fabricated intelligence reports to justify invading Iraq. (The point of this deception, presumably, was to "steal their oil," an accusation I find mildly amusing. If that were truly the case, wouldn't we still be there siphoning off their oil wells?) This accusation can hold water only if you falsify the story. Saddam had WMD. We know it because he used them, only the second leader in history to do so (after Hitler).

The assertion that Iraq was still a WMD state, moreover, was not a uniquely American accusation or simply the product of the febrile minds of the dastardly "neoconservatives" working for George W. Bush. The determination that Saddam still possessed chemical weapons was shared by key U.S. allies in NATO. The Bush administration shared the intelligence with politicians on both sides of the aisle in Congress, who agreed with the assessment and voted in favor of the second Gulf War.

Now, what Saddam did with those weapons is another question entirely, but he flagrantly and repeatedly violated the terms of the 1991 ceasefire agreement and numerous United Nations resolutions, which required him to demonstrate that he was dismantling his WMD facilities and destroying or handing over his stockpiles for destruction.

If the assertion that Saddam Hussein, an evil dictator, was in possession of weapons of mass destruction wasn't simply reasonable but almost unanimously agreed upon, was the decision to go to war a sound one? Not necessarily. Saddam may have been evil and clearly in breach of the agreement that ended the previous Gulf War. But that did not mean that he was an imminent threat to U.S. national interests or that he would be the man to provide mass-casualty weapons to Osama bin Laden.

Here it is important to dispel some erroneous conventional wisdom. The common assertion that Saddam Hussein would never assist the likes of Osama bin Laden is plainly incorrect. Although the Bush administration's assertion prior to the invasion that men connected with the Iraqi intelligence service had met with Al Qaeda agents in Europe was based on unreliable information, there were nevertheless operational ties between the regime and the jihadist terrorist group.[1]

This relationship of mutual and tactical "back-scratching" is understandable. Saddam hated America, especially after the first Gulf War almost led to his demise, and Al Qaeda was dedicated to attacking the West, America in particular. So the old Arab adage of "my enemy's enemy being my friend" applied to Saddam and bin Laden. But only up to a point.

Saddam Hussein, posing as a new Nebuchadnezzar, may have made a show of going to the mosque, but his regime was in fact a Stalinist dictatorship. Saddam's objective was never to die a *shaheed,* a martyr in a jihad, nor to rebuild the theocratic empire and anoint himself the caliph. He was a secular Baathist at heart, ideologically godless, driven to obtain and maintain power. There was a limit, therefore, to his cooperation with any jihadist group such as Al Qaeda, with its theocratic mission and dreams of reestablishing a religious empire.

And one of the greatest obstacles to strategic collaboration between bin Laden and Saddam was the jihadist ideal of death in the way of jihad. Saddam was not informed by apocalyptic visions of the end of the world and Judgment Day, and he was clearly not eager to die as a holy warrior. Just look at the lengths he went to after the U.S. invasion of 2003 to evade capture and stay alive!

Consequently, we can assert one thing with complete certainty: If Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction at his disposal after

September 11, 2001, it was exceedingly unlikely that he or his regime would have provided such weapons to Islamic extremists like Osama bin Laden. For bin Laden, sharing an enemy in America and cooperating at a low level with Baghdad was one thing. But in the long run, Saddam Hussein was as much his enemy as America, if not more so, since Saddam was not a "true" or devout Muslim.

And Saddam would have known that bin Laden viewed him as his eventual enemy. Giving bin Laden the ability to kill thousands or even millions in one attack would not have served Saddam's goals of maintaining earthly power in Iraq. What if bin Laden turned around and used them against him and his regime?

President Bush and his advisors should have understood this, but they didn't. Or their personal animosities left over from the first Gulf War—the desire for revenge and settling scores—outweighed their assessment of the likelihood that Baghdad would ever give Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction. In any case, the Bush cabinet pressed on and made the case, Congress agreed, and America went to war for the second time since 9/11.

DEMOCRATIC FAILURE IN IRAQ

This time the commitment was even greater than in Afghanistan, but the number of allies far fewer, and NATO was left out of the picture. We deployed the air force to pound strategic sites. Then the ground forces attacked Saddam's forces inside Iraq. Eventually the Baathist regime fell, and Saddam went on the run. In their place we erected the Coalition Provisional Authority, an American government of occupation headed eventually by Paul Bremer, a friend of the president. And then, as in Afghanistan, Washington fell into the trap of monumental mission creep. Instead of sticking to the simple objective of removing Saddam, ensuring that Iraq no longer had WMD capabilities, and putting in place a government that would be conducive to U.S. interests, the powers that be defaulted once again to "nation building," the goal being to turn Iraq into a modern country with a representative government allied to America.

There were, however, several serious obstacles to achieving such a laudable objective, most having to do with culture and history. An artisan or an engineer is constrained by the materials available to him. It is impossible

to make a baseball bat out of balsa wood or a sword out of aluminum. Likewise, it is impossible to establish a functioning market democracy in a society that has known only dictatorship, at least in the time frame the Bush White House had in mind.[2] The reality in 2003 was that Saddam may have been deposed, but his legacy was ingrained in the society of Iraq.

Decades of brutal Stalinist dictatorship had frayed the fabric of the society in ways that made stability and the healthy cohabitation of the various parts of the population unimaginable. This was so not just because of the tortures, executions, systematic rape, and genocide used by Saddam to cow the populations into submission, but because his regime generally favored Iraq's minority Sunnis to the detriment of the majority Shia. Saddam may have had little time for worshipping Allah in the mosque, but he secured his government by surrounding himself with and favoring his fellow Sunnis, particularly the members of his own tribe from Tikrit, while targeting the Shia for special "attention" by the organs of state security.

Once Saddam was gone and the future of Iraq was up for grabs, members of the Shia community decided Baghdad was theirs by right, and in this they had a powerful ally: the Shia government of neighboring Iran. And so it was that instead of seeking peaceful coexistence, the oppressed became the oppressors.

Just as the Shia were coming into the ascendency after the fall of Saddam, U.S. policy and the decisions made by Al Qaeda combined to further destabilize Iraq. In a strange decision by "proconsul" Bremer, the Baathist apparatus was excised. Anyone who had been a member of the Baath Party under Saddam lost his job in the new Iraqi government. And this included the men best positioned to destabilize the nation, the officers of Saddam's military. Men hardened in the wars with Iran and the United States in the 1980s and '90s, men trained to fight, who knew not only the terrain of Iraq intimately but also where all the weapons were kept—these men lost their jobs, their prestige, and a way to feed their families.

Washington's motivation for taking this step was clear: Saddam's regime had been evil, one of the most evil in modern history. That regime had been Baathist, and a new Iraq should recognize the complicity of those who were members of the party. The analogy was the "denazification" of Germany after World War II.

But there was one problem with this analogy. The Allies had not excluded all card-carrying members of the Nazi Party from official positions in the governing apparatus of occupied West Germany or in the subsequently established Federal Republic. If they had, Germany would probably have taken much longer to recover from the ravages of World War II, if it ever recovered at all. This did not mean that the Allies didn't draw a line between Germany's Nazi past and its democratic future. That was the purpose of the Nuremberg Trials.

Nazism was evil, as all the world had seen with the liberation of the death camps of Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Treblinka. If Germany—and Europe—were to move forward, there had to be a reckoning for the people most responsible for the horror. Hitler was dead, but many of his senior leadership were in custody. The chief decision makers of the Third Reich were publicly tried for the war crimes and genocide committed in the name of the Nazi state. Once the verdicts were handed down and the death sentences carried out, the line had been drawn: those most guilty had been punished, and the Germans and the world could move on.

This kind of accounting is what Iraq desperately needed. But instead of symbolically punishing just the key members of Saddam's machine, we punished all party members. This decision by Bremer and the Bush administration proved to be a time bomb, eventually destroying any chance of democratizing Iraq. In time it even contributed to the rapid rise of ISIS.

AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

With the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq became incredibly important to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Previously, Al Qaeda had focused its attentions on Afghanistan and then on terrorist attacks against the United States.

Afghanistan was the birthplace of modern jihadism. After the USSR invaded the nation in 1979 and assassinated its head of state, the plight of the Muslims of Afghanistan inspired a global effort to enlist other Muslims to come and fight the godless infidels who had invaded sacred Muslim territory. This is in fact how Al Qaeda was created.

A charismatic Jordanian cleric called Abdullah Azzam established the Maktab Khadamat al Mujahidin al Arab (MAK), or Arab Mujahideen

Services Bureau, in neighboring Pakistan. Called the Services Bureau for short, this organization served as a clearinghouse for recruiting and training mujahideen from around the world. This was the earliest incarnation of Al Qaeda. As his deputy, Azzam hired none other than Osama bin Laden.

By the time the Soviets were defeated, after a decade of brutal fighting, this organization had recruited and deployed an estimated fifty-five thousand jihadist fighters. In November 1989, Azzam was assassinated in a car bomb attack in Peshawar, and bin Laden inherited the organization. Eventually he changed its name to the Base for Holy War against the Jews and Crusaders—the Base, or "Al Qaeda," for short. And then he drastically re-purposed the organization.

Under bin Laden, Al Qaeda fighters were sent to conflict zones around the world to support local Muslims fighting infidels, be it in Bosnia, Kashmir, or Chechnya. At the same time, the fight for Allah's glory was taken to the heart of the most powerful infidel nation of all: the United States of America. Al Qaeda trained and recruited—and simply inspired—a new type of jihadi. These were not soldiers versed in traditional guerrilla warfare but men—and eventually women too—who, disguised as tourists, students, or ordinary American citizens, plotted to kill and maim Americans around the world as well as on U.S. soil. This change of strategy would take Al Qaeda from the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan to Manhattan, Washington, Fort Hood, Boston, and beyond.

But after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Al Qaeda saw another opportunity. Just as the mujahideen had fatally weakened the USSR with their "war of a thousand cuts" in Afghanistan in the 1980s, so they could turn post-Saddam Iraq into an inferno of sectarian violence, which would demand ever increasing military deployments by the United States. The Soviet Union was no more. Now it was time to do the same thing to the last surviving infidel superpower by dragging it into a Dantean hell of car bombs and IEDs. And so it was that Al Qaeda sent its commanders and fighters into Iraq and the post-invasion insurgency was born.

To be clear, the distressing levels of violence in Iraq after 2005 were the result of several factors and actors, not just Al Qaeda. Former Baathists—out of power and out of a job—were motivated to destabilize the new system. As the U.S. occupational government handed over power to elected Iraqi officials and the power in Baghdad shifted to the Shiites, other actors

were likewise spurred to subversion and violence. Al Qaeda simply added its own depraved vision of chaos to this explosive cocktail.

In the months that followed, Al Qaeda's man in Iraq, a thug from Jordan by the name of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, fomented violence against U.S. and coalition forces and within the Muslim community of Iraq itself. As the situation deteriorated, with bombings and summary executions becoming a daily occurrence, the Bush administration argued that it was better to fight the jihadists "over there" than to fight them in America. As sensible as that argument sounded, it missed the point that the legions of jihadists, disaffected Baathists, and Iraqi Shia militiamen would not have been targeting U.S. servicemen in such great numbers had Iraq not been invaded in the first place.

Eventually the White House agreed to a "surge" in Iraq, following the model of the increased footprint it had approved previously in Afghanistan. This measure temporarily subdued some of the violence, coming as it did not long after Zarqawi was located and killed. Then, just as the surge was showing positive results in Iraq, U.S. forces got a new commander in chief.

NEW PRESIDENT, NEW MISTAKES

The young senator from Illinois who became the leader of the most powerful nation in the world had won the election of 2008 on a specific platform: the war in Afghanistan was America's "good war," and the war in Iraq was America's "bad war." This slogan was based on the assumption that Iraq wasn't a threat to America, that its invasion was the product of a neoconservative obsession, and that Afghanistan was really the epicenter of Al Qaeda activity. But the realities of global jihadism weren't quite that simple.

Al Qaeda had changed during the years following September 11, 2001. Previously an international guerrilla organization able to deploy its fighters around the world, it had evolved into a global terror network with cells in more than fifty countries. When the Bush administration had successfully targeted its camps and bases in Afghanistan, its leadership had gone into hiding, where it redefined Al Qaeda's role in the world. Hiding in his various safe houses, the last being in the town of Abbottabad, around the corner from Pakistan's equivalent of West Point, Osama bin Laden chose—

or was forced—to relinquish his operational control of global jihadism, becoming instead the symbol and ideological hub of the movement to destroy the infidel and initiate the rebirth of a cleansed and victorious Islam.

Through dozens of propaganda videos and audio recordings, bin Laden exercised a growing influence on how jihadism was understood by fundamentalist Muslims around the world. Most important, his deputy in Yemen, Anwar al Awlaki, a jihadist cleric born and raised in America, developed Al Qaeda's newest deadly weapon: an online do-it-yourself jihadist magazine in English, *Inspire.* This slickly executed publication combined the ideological and theological justifications for attacks like 9/11 with the training material and technical knowledge to maintain a terrorist cell in the West and execute mass-casualty attacks. *Inspire* offered detailed instructions for turning an ordinary pressure cooker into an antipersonnel mine, a recipe that would be followed to the letter by the Chechen Tsarnaev brothers when they attacked the Boston Marathon in the name of Islam. Awlaki was involved with or the inspirational force behind attack after jihadist attack, including the Fort Hood massacre, the Christmas Day bomb plot, and the Times Square bomber.

President Barack Obama, a Democrat, did not prove as dovish as his supporters had expected. He may have been against large-scale military deployments in the cause of nation building, but he was more than ready to kill jihadists, or to have them killed. In 2011, both bin Laden and Awlaki met their maker—the former at the hands of a special operations force covertly helicoptered into Pakistan, the latter at the end of a missile strike from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). In fact, President Obama resorted to targeted killings by UAV at a rate that outstripped President Bush's by orders of magnitude. Not only was he far more willing to have America's enemies killed remotely—often to the detriment of our relations with other nations, especially Pakistan—but he was willing to kill American citizens as well, citizens like Awlaki and Samir Khan, the editor of *Inspire.*

Did the president's keenness for Hellfire missiles represent a better understanding of the threat to America and a greater commitment to winning the war against jihadism? Strangely enough, it didn't. As one high-ranking special forces general shared with me, President Obama and his team see the "kinetic" options, such as drone strikes, as the "Easy Button." The thinking has become: "So-and-So is a member of Al Qaeda? Find him.

Launch a drone. Kill him. Then we will prevent the next 9/11." Unfortunately, this logic is not only simplistic, it is dangerous.

America has demonstrated in the past fifteen years that it is preeminent in the use of overt force. As the same general told me, "If we know you are a high-value target, and I have your GPS coordinates, we can kill you in the next seventy-two hours." But so what? The administration strikingly misunderstands the simple math of extremism. If you kill one jihadist and fifteen other fundamentalist Muslims volunteer to replace him the next day, your UAV strike or special operations mission can turn into a recruiting platform for the enemy, dooming you to endless rounds of "whack-a-mole" against the growing ranks of jihadists.

As to where those growing ranks are coming from, the Obama administration has a strange theory. I will dissect that theory and explain how it has endangered America in more detail later, but here is the abbreviated version. Terrorism is a natural response of uneducated human beings who have been disenfranchised politically and economically. If we can solve the "root grievances" of the poor and oppressed around the world, there will be no more terrorists, and Americans will be safe. This view is of course absurd.

If poverty, lack of education, and political disenfranchisement were the causes of terrorism, then much of India and most of China would be populated by terrorists. But they are not. And this is because terrorism is the violent expression of ideology, not objective conditions—what has famously been called "propaganda of the deed." The terrorist's ideology may be secular and political—communist or fascist, for example—or it may be religious—Christian, Islamic, or even Hindu. And here we encounter the second and greater problem with the Obama administration's approach to the jihadist threat.

Since 2009, the doctrine of the American government has been that religion has nothing to do with the terrorist threat to the Republic and that Islam *must not* be seen to be connected to terrorism. This dogma, emanating from the White House, which imposes the euphemism "violent extremism" in place of global jihad, commands such thorough obedience at every level of government that when a man in Arab dress attempts to assassinate a peace officer in Philadelphia and declares himself a follower of the Islamic

State, the mayor insists that the attack has nothing to do with Islam. And so we stumble blindfolded across the battlefield that is the world after 9/11.

Worst of all, the Obama government has allowed its ideological preferences and beliefs to infect the function of national security, the training of our warfighters and national security professionals. In 2011, with unclassified memos to the Pentagon and Department of Justice, the White House established a system of censoring and monitoring that still stands today. Under this system, if you train our military or the agents or analysts of the FBI, your training materials must be reviewed by an anonymous review board, which can demand changes or even have you barred from engaging with our brave men and women. The yardstick: mention of Islam or even jihad. You may disagree or wish to challenge the board's decision, but there is no recourse, no method of appeal.

This is the Obama administration's fantasyland, a world as absurd as the Bush-era belief that democracy is a "shake and bake" exercise that can be achieved through the barrel of a gun. But Obama's fantasy is much more dangerous.

Today jihad is in the ascendancy. Bin Laden may be dead, but we have a new caliphate, an Islamic State larger than Great Britain, with a population of more than six million and a daily income of $4 million. People are being decapitated, crucified, and burnt alive in the name of Allah. British soldiers are being decapitated on the streets of England. Armed jihadists are inside the Canadian parliament. Concertgoers in Paris are being slaughtered at will by Kalashnikov-wielding mujahideen, and government employees attending Christmas parties in California are being mowed down in the name of the new emperor of Islam.

It is time for the America that vanquished the Third Reich and the Soviet Union to rise from its slumber. It is time for us to speak truthfully about those who wish to kill us or enslave us. It is time again to speak the words "evil" and "enemy." And it is time to draw a plan for victory, calling on strategies that have proved themselves against other totalitarian foes.

This is one man's plan based upon a plan that has worked before.

CHAPTER 2

THE STORY OF JIHAD

Before September 11, 2001, the average American knew little about Islam or Muslims. "Geography is destiny," and America is a continent-sized nation with friendly neighbors to the north and south and isolating oceans to the east and west, keeping our interaction with Islam to a minimum. But fifteen years after 9/11, most Americans' understanding of Islam has scarcely improved. That ignorance is both surprising and dangerous.

So what is Islam, and where does jihad fit into this religion of more than a billion adherents?

The story of this faith begins in the seventh century, when a man called Mohammed is said to have received the revelation of Allah from the angel Gabriel in a cave somewhere outside the city of Mecca on the Arabian Peninsula. A crossroads of caravan traffic, the bustling city of Mecca was a center of religious activity for pilgrims of many faiths, including Jews, pagan tribes, and local animists, who worshipped nature and inanimate objects.

But the man Mohammed (ca. AD 570–632) was to bring them a different message. According to the story of the founding of Islam, Mohammed was chosen to bring the people of the world back to the one true faith. There had only ever been one God, and his name was Allah. The Jews of the Old Testament had worshipped Allah and honored the prophets Abraham and Moses as the prophets of Allah. But the Jews had not been

faithful, failing to submit themselves to the will of Allah (the word *Islam* in fact means "submission"). Mainstream Islam asserts that the Jews had distorted the revelations given to the great prophets by Allah, and so Allah sent another mighty prophet, called Jesus, to correct the mistakes of the Jews.

Islam recognizes Jesus as a great prophet but denies his divinity, regarding the notion of the Trinity as utterly blasphemous. Jesus's mission was to bring the people back to Allah, and here there was a problem. If Jesus was merely a man, then Islam must propound an alternative to the Christian narrative of his death and resurrection, because human beings don't come back from the dead. In fact, Islam is adamant that Jesus did not die on Good Friday. Instead, a man who looked exactly like him was executed in his stead, and on the third day a group of his disciples rolled away the stone from his tomb and stole the body of Jesus's *Doppelgänger,* faking the resurrection. The account in chapter 4, verses 157–158, of the Koran reads:

> They said in boast, "We killed Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah"—but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them, and those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no knowledge, but only conjecture, for of a surety they killed him not—nay, Allah raised him up unto Himself.

According to Islam, therefore, Jesus never died here on earth but was bodily taken up to heaven. Christianity, therefore, is a man-made lie, a fabrication, a confidence trick engineered by a small group of men to gain power over millions of others. Six centuries later, Allah gave creation one more chance to come back to the one true faith, by sending his last prophet to the Arabian Peninsula with the final, authentic version of his word. This series of revelations would correct what the Jews had done to the original teachings given to Allah's prophets Moses and Abraham and undo the lies of Christianity.

Over a period of twenty-two years, it is said, the man chosen by Allah would repeatedly go into the wilderness and each time receive a few more verses of God's final revelation, which he would memorize. Returning

home, he would dictate these verses to family and friends, who wrote them down for posterity. (According to Sunni Islam, Mohammed was illiterate and so there was no other way for the word of God to be memorialized.) Long after Mohammed's death, these verses were collected in the work we know as the Koran.

From the beginning of these revelations, Mohammed would share what he was hearing with the pagan and polytheistic Arabs of Mecca, warning the tribes to stop worshipping idols and multiple gods and instead to follow the one true faith. Otherwise they risked eternal hellfire. This message was understandably unpopular with the people of Mecca, even among Mohammed's own tribe, the Quresh, who ostracized him and tried to drive him out of the city. A great distance to the north, however, the city of Yathrib was engulfed in civil war, Arab killing Arab and Arab killing Jew. In the hope that Mohammed might in fact have some special power and could bring peace to the city, the elders of Yathrib invited him. In 622, he embarked on the dangerous journey across the desert now known as the *hijra.* (The numbering of years in the lunar-based calendar of the Arab world begins with Mohammed's departure from Mecca for Yathrib, as the Christian calendar reckons years—*anno Domini*—from the Incarnation.)

Mohammed found a considerably more receptive audience for his preaching in Yathrib, where thousands of people converted to the religion of Islam. They renamed their city Madinat al Nabi, or City of the Prophet, or Medina, as we now call it. After several years of ruling over the city, Mohammed decided to return to Mecca and the Arab tribes who had previously rejected him.

Arriving at Mecca with thousands of followers armed to the teeth and committed to Allah and his messenger, Mohammed gave the pagans and the polytheists a simple choice: convert or die. This is why today we say that the Koran has two distinct—and contradictory—halves: the "peace verses," sometimes referred to as the Meccan verses, and the "war verses," or Medinan verses. The former are pacific and conciliatory, recognizing Jews and Christians as "People of the Book" (meaning the Old Testament) and exhorting Muslims to collaborate with them. The latter contain the kinetic or martial passages, such as chapter 9, verses 5 and 29, which command Muslims to kill infidels wherever they find them.

The victorious Mohammed established a new theocratic empire for the faithful of Islam, headquartered in Mecca, the city that had previously rejected him. It would grow rapidly, spreading from Spain in the west to India in the east, North Africa in the south, and central Europe in the north, a caliphate that was larger than the Roman Empire ever was.

The word "jihad" was used throughout the founding period of Islam, and it appears again and again in the Koran. Sometimes it refers to the struggle to be a good Muslim, "striving" internally against weakness and temptation. But far more often it refers to literal warfare, to the use of force against the infidel, and for many years "jihad" was also used to refer to fighting those Muslims who disagreed with the current emperor and to fighting those non-Muslims who refused to convert or submit to the rule of Islam.

The post-9/11 debate about Islam and the meaning of jihad has often suffered from a superficial understanding of the term. Some insist loudly that jihad simply refers to striving to be a good Muslim, while others say that it means only "holy war." So what is the truth? Here we need some historical perspective, because, as with some other important words, the meaning of jihad has changed over the centuries.

Theologically, jihad encompasses four varieties of human activity defined by Islamic theologians and jurists. The first of these is the "jihad of the heart," the so-called "greater jihad" of fighting evil within oneself. The second and third definitions involve the jihads of the "mind and tongue"—condoning "right" behavior in others and counseling those who, not having submitted themselves fully to the will of Allah, have gone astray. Finally, and most important to us, there is "jihad by the sword," which has become in recent decades the foundation of the global jihadist ideology that most threatens America.

Repeatedly reinterpreted and redefined since the days of Mohammed, jihad by the sword has been used by believers again and again to rally their coreligionists in the pursuit of political objectives. Today Al Qaeda and ISIS use this concept to justify the direct targeting of civilians in terrorist attacks. But violent jihad predates 9/11 by centuries.

THE SEVEN SWORDS OF JIHAD

Since the earliest days of Islam and its theocratic caliphate, jihad by the sword has been shaped by seven historically influenced political conceptions of holy war. These appeared in the following order:

1. Empire building
2. The suppression of apostate subjects, or "false Muslims"
3. Revolution against "false" Muslim leaders
4. The anticolonial struggle and the "purification" of the religion
5. Countering Western influence and *jahiliyyah,* or pagan ignorance of Allah
6. Guerrilla warfare against infidel invaders
7. The direct targeting of civilians in terrorist attacks

Each of these versions of jihad by the sword has been shaped by the specific political needs of a given age and in response to a specific enemy.

When Mohammed was building a new state, jihad was used to justify the expansion of Islam. Although the Koran does not refer to empire building in the military sense as "jihad," chapter 25, verse 52, stipulates, "Obey not the disbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost endeavor." Understood in the context of Mohammed's return from Medina and the ensuing conflict with the Arabs of Mecca, it is clear that striving is in this instance connected to post-*hijra* combat, as the founder of Islam returned to violently enforce his new writ. This is the first offensive use of the concept, referring to the conflict to establish order among the unbelieving Arab tribes in and around Mecca through the use of military might.

When Mohammed's successor, Abu Bakr (after whom the head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, has named himself), faced similarly resistant tribes on the Arabian Peninsula threatening the order Mohammed had previously established, the second meaning of jihad was born: *ridda,* or the war against apostasy. This was war against rebellious subjects of the Islamic empire.

The third definition of jihad appeared centuries later, after the eclipse of the Abbasid caliphate's strength, starting in the second half of the thirteenth century. It is this reworking of the meaning of jihad, most significantly by the fundamentalist scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), that bears on the survival of America's Sunni partners, like Jordan and Egypt, today.

Behind this redefinition was the need to provide Muslims with the right to revolt against their own leaders, specifically the Mongols. Islam had previously prohibited revolution against Muslim rulers. Ibn Taymiyya, to whom modern-day jihadists like Al Qaeda and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi appeal, argued that jihad is permissible against one's own leaders if they do not live as true Muslims and if their rule does not conform to the requirements of the Koran and Sharia law. Sharia, literally meaning "the way," refers to the whole system of religiously grounded laws and regulations based upon the Koran and *Hadith.*

Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, on the issue of rebelling against leaders. His *Rulings of Fighting the Mongols* states:

> And it is known by necessity from the religion of the Muslims, and the agreement of all the Muslims, that whoever permits the following of a religion other than Islam, or the following of a Sharia other than the Sharia of Mohammed, then he is a *kafir* [unbeliever], and it is like the *kufr* [blasphemy] of one who believes in part of the Book [the Koran] and then disbelieves in another part of the Book.

At the time, Arab power was waning and the Mongol, Turkic, and Tartar forces were fusing to take control of Islamic land, their rulers often calling themselves Muslims. Seeing these "false" Muslim leaders as deadly threats to the purity of Islam, Ibn Taymiyya was explicit about how the "true" believers must respond:

> Fighting the Tartars, those who came to the land of Shaam [the Levant],[1] is a religious duty according to the Book and the Sunna [traditions of Islam], for indeed Allah said in the Koran: "And fight them until *fitna* [schism or blasphemous upheaval] is no more, and the human way of life becomes all for Allah."

In the Middle Ages, therefore, jihad came to convey on the people a right to denounce their rulers as un-Islamic and wage a legitimate religious revolution. Unilaterally excommunicating another Muslim, declaring him an apostate from the religion of Islam, came to be labeled *takfirism,* an

ideological tool that is a primary weapon of today's global jihadists such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. We will see presently how they use it.

The fourth political reconceptualization of jihad began four hundred years later. In the early eighteenth century, as the European powers pushed into North Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, the threat to Islamic societies was twofold. The military and political might of empires such as Britain's had to be physically resisted, as did the West's growing cultural influence upon the purity of the Islamic faith. During this period jihad was redefined as resistance to the colonial forces of the West.

This new interpretation of jihad was typified by the pronouncements of the fundamentalist Islamic scholar Mohammed ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703–1792), the founder of the Wahhabi movement within Sunni Islam. The practical consequences of this new form of jihad were amply demonstrated during Abd al Qadir's decade-long resistance to the 1830 French invasion of Algeria and by the Sudanese resistance to the British.

The nonmilitary element of this redefinition of jihad—what one author has described as Islam's internal "housecleaning"[2]—was represented by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi's call to spiritual revival and the purification of India's Muslims as the Mughal (or "Mogul") Empire faltered and weakened.

Dehlawi (1703–1762) was motivated by what he saw as the plight of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent and the dilution of the faith by non-Islamic influences, including Hindu and Western cultures and new alien ideas such as capitalism. By bringing the core tenets of Islam back to the forefront of *dawa* (proselytizing and religious education), and with his own translation of the Koran into Farsi (the lingua franca of the Middle East at that time), Dehlawi helped promote a general restoration of originalist Islamic teachings. His goal was to purify Islam and bring it back to "basics." His idea that ignorance of Allah led to the majority of the ills suffered by Muslims around the world would become a central theme of later, far more violent, purification movements. These were all designed to purge Islam of *jahiliyyah,* that pagan ignorance of the one true faith that Mohammed had originally railed against among the tribes of Mecca and eventually eradicated through force.

This "purifying" version of jihad would lead directly to the next interpretation, one that relies heavily on the principles laid down hundreds of years earlier by Ibn Taymiyya, including his doctrine of *takfirism.* Fathered and developed over decades by another Indian Islamist scholar, Abul A'la Mawdudi, this fifth version of jihad was later transformed into the modern concept of jihad by the pivotal extremist writer Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, the intellectual grandfather of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS.

For Mawdudi (1903–1979), the founder of Jamaat e Islami, which would become the largest Islamic organization in Asia, it was imperative to politicize Islam, with the goal of establishing a truly Islamic state, whose subjects would live in accordance with the prescriptions of the Koran. His work led to the establishment of Pakistan, carved out of the territory of post-Raj India. He taught that Islam is universal in a wholly doctrinaire way: "Everything in the universe is 'Muslim' for it obeys Allah by submission to His laws." The breadth of the faith is limitless:

> Islam is not a "religion" in the sense this term is commonly understood.
>
> It is a system encompassing all fields of living.
>
> Islam means politics, economics, legislation, science, humanism, health, psychology and sociology.

The believer must be a "slave of Allah," with "absolute obedience to Allah" representing a "fundamental right" of the Creator, since the believer does "not have the right to choose a way of life for himself."

Although Mawdudi was never satisfied with the implementation of his vision in Pakistan, his emphasis on the need for utter purity, the global mandate of Islam, and the need to step out of the mosque and become political proved influential far beyond India and Pakistan. One man who read Mawdudi's writings was the Egyptian writer and Muslim Brotherhood strategist Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who believed that the leaders of the post–World War II Arab states and the influence of Western "soft power" had brought about a new *jahiliyyah,* another age of polytheism and ignorance. Just as the apostate Mongol and Tartar leaders were resisted in the Middle Ages, so the false Muslim leaders of the twentieth century would have to be replaced, by force if necessary. Only then could Islam be

purified, a pure Sharia-based Koranic way of life be restored, and the empire of the caliphate be reestablished for the glory of God.

But the "near enemy" of un-Islamic Arab leaders was not the only target of Qutb and his accomplices in the Brotherhood. After being invited to the United States after World War II and living among the infidel Americans for two years, Qutb decided that the Arabs' puppet masters had to be destroyed as well. And so he wrote *Milestones,* the most influential work on global jihadism in the twentieth century, a book that would not only shape the plans of the Muslim Brotherhood but would become an essential text of Al Qaeda and other key jihadi groups.

With the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, jihad would no longer be limited to resistance against the cultural and political influence of the secular West or un-Islamic Arab rulers. The Afghans themselves required no theological motivation to resist the brutal Soviet domination of their country, but for the foreign fighters who joined them—the so-called Arab mujahideen—jihad was the battle cry, and so a sixth interpretation emerged, becoming, as it were, a global brand.

This modern version of jihad was propagated by the Jordanian cleric Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), who traveled the globe convincing believers that they must leave their empty lives and join the fight to expel the infidel from the Muslim lands of Central Asia. Most important, Azzam got around the traditional requirement that a holy war be declared by the legitimate authority of a caliph by redefining military resistance as an individual duty. As he wrote in his introduction to the fatwa *Defense of the Muslim Lands*:

> [I]f a piece of Muslim land the size of a hand-span is infringed upon, then jihad becomes a personal obligation on every Muslim male and female, where the child shall march forward without the permission of its parents and the wife without the permission of the husband.

Azzam warned his audiences of the price they would pay if they did not follow the path of military resistance, invoking Ibn Taymiyya by name to justify his version of self-declared jihad and quoting chapter 9, verse 39, of the Koran, the *Sura at Taubah,* the section on repentance:

> If you march not forth, He will punish you with a painful torment and will replace you with another people, and you cannot harm Him at all, since Allah is able to do all things.

By the late 1980s, Azzam's redefinition of jihad in a new political and geostrategic context was so successful that even in the West, Islamic holy war had become synonymous with guerrilla resistance to communist invasion and dictatorship. America itself would come to support the idea of a religious war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, covertly supporting the indigenous mujahideen.

After Azzam's death in 1989, his organization of some fifty-five thousand guerrillas recruited from all over the world, the Arab Mujahideen Services Bureau, was taken over by his deputy, Osama bin Laden. He offered to send his jihadists to protect Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi army but was rebuffed. After the defeat of the godless Russians and the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world order was replaced by the hegemony of a victorious United States, which was invited to bring its infidel troops and influence into the Arabian Peninsula, the home of the holiest sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina. This was an affront to Islam that the Saudi bin Laden would not accept, and so he repurposed his jihadi organization, renaming it Al Qaeda, the "base" for global jihad against the unbelievers.

Now the meaning of holy war was expanded for the seventh time since Mohammed built his empire all those centuries ago. The fight would no longer be focused exclusively on guerrilla warfare in countries where Muslims were under military attack but on the "far enemy." With the East Africa embassy bombings, the assault on the USS *Cole,* and the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, bin Laden successfully defined jihad as the use of terrorism against civilians in the land of the infidel. We arrived at the twenty-first-century version of jihad.

The meaning of jihad has been shaped during the centuries to fit the needs of those wishing to call their coreligionists to join battle against the unbelievers. Osama bin Laden's great historical significance is that he managed to change jihad from guerrilla warfare in faraway lands to the mass murder of civilians on the soil of Western nations—especially America.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CALIPHATE: THE EMPIRE OF ISLAM

As it evolved through the centuries, the concept of jihad was always tied up with that of the caliphate. Once the physical and political embodiment of Islamic power, the empire had waxed and waned as its capital moved from Mecca to Damascus, Baghdad, and finally the old Byzantine capital Constantinople, different ethnic and national elites controlling its center of power at one time or another. But it couldn't last forever.

By the nineteenth century, Western civilization, Western empires, and Western armies were in the ascendant. Islam was ejected from Europe, and many of the regions that had originally been Christian before they had become Muslim were recaptured for Christendom. Other territories that remained Muslim were conquered and subsequently controlled by Western forces. Jihad was no longer an option in a world where the West dominated. The infidel was now in control.

In the twentieth century, as war became industrialized and Western nations targeted each other, Muslim civilization would again be drastically changed. Just a hundred years ago, there still existed a rump caliphate, but it wasn't run by Arabs and its capital was not in the Middle East. The Western world referred to this iteration of the caliphate, run by Turks with its capital at Constantinople, as the Ottoman Empire. But the Ottomans made a bad decision at the onset of World War I, placing their bets on the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires. Ending up on the side of the losers, the Ottoman Empire faced the same fate as the Austro-Hungarian: dismemberment.

Hoping to salvage the remnants of his nation, a young Ottoman officer named Mustafa Kemal logically decided that the only way to survive the defeat was to convince the victors that his people, no longer posing a threat, should be allowed to join the Western "club" of nations. Adopting the name Ataturk, he became the head of a new secular republic called Turkey. Its population may have been Muslim, but its government was avowedly secular, and politics were most definitely separated from religion. To affirm this transformation, Ataturk himself deposed the last caliph in 1924, dissolving the thousand-year-old caliphate and unwittingly laying the foundation for the seventh version of jihad, which now haunts us.

Millions of believers, questioning Ataturk's authority to dissolve the empire, despised his aping of the West and the imposition of the American concept of separation of church and state. For the next ninety years, organization after organization tried to restore the caliphate and revive Islam's heyday, the glorious era of its power and prestige and dominance over the infidel. Sometimes these organizations pursued their goal through politics. But many, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, would resort to violence when nonviolence seemed inadequate, resorting to terrorism, assassination, and subversion. Holy war, no longer declared by the caliph against infidels who resisted the expansion of the caliphate, would be the means of cleansing the world of pagan disbelief and eventually reestablishing an empire that had been lost through the perfidy of false Muslims and collaborators.

In the second half of the twentieth century, jihad evolved into a series of campaigns directly targeting Western nations or other non-Muslim groups. These guerrilla activities took place around the globe, from the disputes over Kashmir on the Indian subcontinent to the civil wars in the Balkans and the Chechen wars of independence in the Caucasus. In each conflict, no matter how geographically remote, the ideal of jihad was given new life. Muslims from all the regions of the world were recruited to join the war to rebuild the caliphate for the glory of God.

This was the background from which Al Qaeda, an ideological child of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged on the battlefields of Afghanistan, eventually becoming a global terror network with cells in more than fifty countries and affiliates and sympathizers in many more. Under the millionaire bin Laden and the prestige of the Al Qaeda brand, jihad was once again redefined to fit a new mission. After the irregular warfare campaigns of Afghanistan, bin Laden was emboldened to take the fight to the heart of the infidel, striking not military targets such as troop convoys or attack helicopters but civilians in downtown New York, Washington, Fort Hood, or Boston. The idea was to spread the attacks across infidel soil, striking fear into the hearts of those who refused to recognize the one true faith and emboldening those who were looking for meaning and purpose in the secularizing postmodern world.

Al Qaeda was able to establish offshoot organizations in key strategic areas, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb, and to ally with, leverage, and exploit preexisting Islamic insurgent groups such as the Taleban in Afghanistan and al Shabaab in Somalia. These groups were originally focused on national agendas and not motivated by the idea of the caliphate, but bin Laden changed that, skillfully manipulating and repurposing them to become parts of the new global jihadist movement.

And then 9/11 happened.

Up to that point, U.S. intelligence had regarded Osama bin Laden primarily as a financier of terrorism, not a mastermind or pivotal character in a global enterprise. But the events of that sunny Tuesday morning revealed to the world exactly who Osama bin Laden was—the new master of the new jihad. He had taken the seventh-century concept central to the empire-building warfare of an Arab community—a concept that had evolved over the centuries in different ways in the hands of different groups—and turned it into a universal ideology with a universal objective: the creation of a new caliphate that would span the globe and last until Judgment Day.

For more than a decade he succeeded in part because of the poor strategic decisions made by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Violence in the name of Allah would once again be a reality, especially after the series of events inappropriately dubbed the "Arab Spring." The constricting effects of colonialism and the bipolar stasis of the Cold War were long gone, and now regime after Arab regime fell, with new jihadis unleashed daily, thousands of men and sometimes even women, who from the failure of their own political elites and the stultification of their backward societies were looking for purpose and higher meaning. And what better meaning than fighting for God?

Yet even Al Qaeda and bin Laden, the man who had made jihad a universal battle cry, were eventually eclipsed by a new player, a former franchisee of the Al Qaeda brand. The organization we came to know as Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mesopotamian offshoot of the original Al Qaeda, eventually stole the limelight and redefined jihad yet again. But this time, these "holy warriors" would succeed where all the others had failed. Al Qaeda in Iraq would break from its mother ship, and the new Islamic State of Iraq and Al Shaam would then move into Syria, only to come back stronger than before. And finally ISIS would become the Islamic state that

so many had been calling for ever since that day in 1924 when the original theocratic Islamic state had been done away with.

The caliphate, and the caliph, were back.

As I have noted, the etymological root of "Islam" in Arabic is "submission," not "peace" as so many people seem to think. The only peace that "Islam" connotes is the peace of submission or surrender. Surrender or submission to what? To the will of Allah.

The rectitude or devoutness of a Muslim believer is measured by how fully he submits himself to the will of Allah. And how does one know the will of God? Well, naturally from the words of his best and final revelation to mankind, communicated to Mohammed and eventually collected in the Koran. In the nature of the relationship between the revealed and the believer and what reality that establishes here on earth, Islam is very different from the Christian faith.

The followers of Christ are also measured by their ability to follow the requirements laid down in Holy Scripture, with Jesus Christ and the New Testament being the fulfillment of the earlier laws and commandments of the Old Testament, yet the origins of Christianity and Islam and the political legacies of the two faiths are completely different.

The Christian Church was born after Jesus's followers, having seen him executed by crucifixion and resurrected, saw him ascend into heaven. Islam, on the other hand, was forged in battle, its founder defeating his enemies in war and becoming the head of a new theocratic state, reigning over his followers here on earth. Islam cannot be fully understood unless one recognizes that its founder was at the same time a political leader, a military commander, and a self-proclaimed prophet. Islam, then, is by its nature and its origins a theocracy.

There can be no "separation of mosque and state" if one stays true to the religion practiced by Mohammed and his first followers.[3] There was no distinction between the political and religious in the original caliphate. In fact, there was no distinction between the religious, political, legal, or economic. Islam and the word of Allah regulated all of these spheres in a unitary whole. The political head of the community was also its religious leader.

By contrast, theocracy was never a fundamental element of the Christian faith. Jesus Christ himself articulated the "separation of church and state" when, asked if the Jews should pay taxes to the occupying Romans, he responded, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." These words, with St. Paul's elaboration in the thirteenth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, have shaped the relationship between the spiritual and temporal authorities in the Christian world. This seminal Christian idea finds no counterpart in foundational Islam. The Koran is deemed the source of all law, and sovereignty, rather than being a function of the people's will, is a quality of God to be realized in submission to his will.

This idea of Allah's sovereignty expressed here on earth is the key to understanding why the control of territory has shaped not only the evolution of modern Islamic thought in general but the ideology of jihadists like Al Qaeda and ISIS in particular.

Islam insists that God is unitary. The Christian doctrine of three divine Persons in one God is utterly blasphemous to Muslims. The unitary nature of the Islamic Creator is expressed in Arabic as *tawhid,* "oneness," and is part of the *shahada,* the declaration of faith that is the first pillar of Islam: "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his messenger."[4] This *tawhid* is also a characteristic of the *umma* itself. All Muslims belong to the same body and must act as one if Allah's will is to be fulfilled here on earth. "Oneness above all" has become central to the modern jihadi message. All the earth must be unified for the glory of God, and all people must follow the one true God, Allah. In fact, in almost any given ISIS propaganda video, you will see jihadis making a hand gesture with one finger pointing up. Some have incorrectly interpreted this as pointing to heaven, to Allah. It is in fact an established Salafist-jihadi hand signal signifying oneness, *tawhid.* All people must be part of a unified *umma* or they must die. And in this unification there are parts of the world that are more important than others.

To begin with, there is, of course, the Arabian Peninsula, the birthplace of Islam. Of all the places in the world, Mecca, where Mohammed is said to have begun his preaching, and Yathrib, or Medina, where he is said to have achieved his first large-scale conversions, are the most important. Right behind Mecca and Medina is Jerusalem in Palestine.

Why the importance of Jerusalem, the holy city of Jews and Christians? The answer is found in the story known as the *Isra,* or "Night Journey." According to the Koran and the *Hadith,* Mohammed traveled on a flying horse from Mecca to the "farthest mosque," in Jerusalem, seven hundred miles away, completing the journey in a single night. There he was lifted into heaven, where he met Moses, among others, and visited the seven levels of heaven. During his stay in heaven, he negotiated with Allah on the number of times a Muslim is required to pray every day, getting the number down to five. Then the flying horse, Buraq, took Mohammed back to Mecca. In the late seventh century, after Mohammed's death, the caliph Abd al Malik built the Dome of the Rock shrine on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, supposedly marking the site of Mohammed's ascension into heaven.

Jerusalem's al-Haram ash-Sharif, the site of the Dome of the Rock and the adjacent Al-Aqsa Mosque, thus became the third-holiest site in Islam, and the ancient city has been the epicenter of religious-fueled clashes for centuries. But the twentieth century made it even more important, especially for the jihadists of ISIS, who today have reestablished the caliphate for Allah in the Middle East.

PALESTINE AND JIHAD

For most Westerners the issue of Palestine is wrapped up in the broader question of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict. It is associated with figures such as Yasser Arafat and various Israeli prime ministers, the controversy over settlers, and recurring violence on the streets of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. But this appreciation misses the much deeper story of why exactly this relatively small piece of real estate in the Middle East is constantly contested and why the existence of the modern state of Israel is anathema to so many fundamentalist Muslims and jihadists today.

It is all too easy to forget that before 1948 there was no such thing as a Jewish state, and there hadn't been one for centuries. If you were a Jew, you lived in someone else's country because there was no homeland for the Jewish people. This all changed as a result of World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust.

After more than six million Jews were murdered by the Third Reich, the modern movement to create a home for the Jewish people—a movement called Zionism, founded by the Hungarian Theodor Herzl—finally achieved critical mass. With the United Kingdom losing interest in maintaining, at enormous cost, the British Mandate Territories of Palestine, there was a window of opportunity, and the state of Israel was established in 1948. Almost immediately this tiny nation was attacked by five far larger and ostensibly more powerful Arab and Muslim neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Incredibly, the Jewish state won the war. Not only that, it captured new territories, including parts of the Holy City of Jerusalem. Arabs and Muslims refer to this loss of territory and symbolic sites as the *Nakba,* or catastrophe. But why?

None of the nations concerned was demolished by Israel. None of them suffered devastation comparable to that of England or Germany in the Second World War. So what made the creation of the small state of Israel and the additional loss of lands in the Arab-Israeli War a "catastrophe"? The answer is complex, tied as it is to the twentieth-century fate of the Arab and Muslim world and intertwined with the history of Islam itself.

To begin with, Jerusalem—and Palestine more broadly—have qualified as *dar al Islam,* or sacred Muslim territory, ever since the *Isra* story was told and the caliphate established. The idea that infidels could carve out of Palestine a new non-Muslim nation and capture the Holy City of Jerusalem is shocking to those who believe that once a territory has been captured for the glory of Allah it must always be his.

Then there is the question of the psychological impact of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the later Six-Day War of 1967. In both cases, despite superior numbers, the Arab coalitions suffered humiliating defeats. Ironically, these victories for the new nation of Israel became propaganda victories for future jihadis like Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS.

The fathers of modern jihad, men like Qutb and Azzam, insisted that the *umma,* the global community of Muslims, had lost its way. The West was strong and the Muslim world weak, they taught, because Muslims had become unfaithful and allowed themselves to be corrupted by infidel values. Their leaders likewise had succumbed to heathen values. This condemnation of Muslim infidelity included a particular denunciation of the

“Near Enemy,” Arab heads of state like Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Hashemite royal family of Jordan, who were deemed false Muslims, the worst of the worst: apostates. When these leaders banded together in an attempt to destroy the new Israeli state and recapture sacred Islamic territory, their abject failure was a sign, a final confirmation of their lack of true Islamic credentials. The jihadi logic is simple: if the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon were true Muslims then Allah would have vouchsafed their victory over the infidel Jewish state. But they lost—twice. Therefore they are the worst of the worst.

Palestine and Jerusalem have become battle cries within the larger jihadi call to arms. Groups like Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization would arise and focus their efforts on the short-term objective of Palestinian statehood, but these too, despite their terrorist activities, would be judged as apostate heretics and collaborators for eventually negotiating with the Jewish state. In the end, the only possible expression of Allah’s will is the caliphate. The territory where the prophet Mohammed walked must be incorporated into the fullest expression of Allah’s sovereignty: the caliphate reborn.

But for groups like Al Qaeda, the question of sacred territory such as Palestine was little more than an advertising gimmick, a hook to attract the young potential jihadi. The loss of Jerusalem, where Mohammed walked, and the plight of Muslims today in Gaza or the West Bank, was mercilessly exploited as a way to inflame the youth and recruit them to the cause of today’s holy war. It was only after Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and ISIS arrived that the possibility of the caliphate reborn became a reality. A reality that would expand until all the lands that had been Islamic were so once more, and until the whole world would submit to the will of the one true God, Allah.

CHAPTER 3

1979: ANNUS HORRIBILIS—MODERN JIHAD GOES GLOBAL

Three momentous events mark 1979 as the year in which modern jihad, having evolved over the course of the century, emerged as a global movement: the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran, the siege of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the conditions for an Islamist explosion had existed for a long time, these events were the spark.

On April 1, 1979, following the overthrow of the shah and the return of the fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in France, the Shiite populace of Iran voted in a national referendum to become an Islamic republic. A new constitution outlined the central role of divine revelation in determining Iran's laws, which would be based on the Koran and the *Sunnah,* the traditions of Islam. Then on November 4, a crowd of student protesters who were loyal to Khomeini and committed to taking their revolution to the "great Satan," America, stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took sixty-six Americans hostage. Most of them would remain in captivity until the day Ronald Reagan took Jimmy Carter's place in the White House.

Focused on rescuing their imprisoned countrymen, Americans had a poor understanding of the broader picture in Iran. The elderly Khomeini was not seen as a serious alternative to the royal Pahlavi family, who were friendly to the United States. But the revolutionary cleric and his new guard

of religious fanatics were able to exploit the ancient Persian reserves of pride and resilience, quickly imposing a Shia version of theocracy in which Islam and politics were totally reintegrated. The mullahs of Tehran became the center of political as well as religious power in Tehran.

The Shia of Iran thus demonstrated to the world—including the Sunnis, many of whom would be envious—that the theocratic caliphate was viable in the modern world. It also demonstrated that Muslims not only should but could reject the Western separation of politics and faith. Modernity's separation of Allah's writ and governance could be reversed.

Just as important, the success of the Iranian revolution and the embassy attack proved that the United States, and by inference all other great powers, was not invulnerable. The Muslim world did not have to be the powerless victim of Western machinations, such as interference in Iran's domestic affairs and overarching control of the geopolitics of the Middle East.

Twelve days after the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, about three hundred armed Islamists, inexperienced and ill-equipped, seized control of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, the holiest site in Islam and the equivalent of St. Peter's Basilica in Rome. These men were interested in a holy war not against infidel Christians or Jews but against their fellow Muslims. Led by a man who would later declare himself the long-awaited *mahdi*—just as Mohammed Ahmad had done years before in Khartoum—these jihadists invoked the principle of *takfirism* to declare any Muslim who disagreed with them an apostate, a false Muslim, starting with the royal family, the house of Saud, whom they saw as puppets of the infidel West. Their war was first with their fellow Muslims who had fallen away from the path of purity. The militants managed to hold the Grand Mosque for almost two weeks, a stunning accomplishment. But it was only after the siege was finally broken and most of the jihadists killed—with the covert assistance of French commandos—that the implications of this jihadi attack and the breadth of the conspiracy became clear.

In his definitive account, *The Siege of Mecca,* Yaroslav Trofimov reports that the attackers were not simply a collection of embittered loners or isolated fundamentalists. They shared their hatred of the Saudi regime and their "apostate" countrymen with an influential group of Saudi clerics, key members of the *ulema,* the religious leaders of the country. These

clerics lamented the loss of faith that had made the global community of Muslims, the *ummah,* weak, allowing it to be dominated by the infidel West. Recall that the Saudi state was founded on a compact between the house of Saud and the fundamentalist cleric Mohammed ibn Abd al Wahhab. In the eyes of these puritanical clerics, the behavior of the royal family and the spread of Western influence across the Arabian Peninsula were signs that it was time for that compact to be revoked. The clerics encouraged a turn to violence, offering a religious sanction for jihad against the house of Saud and the other "apostate" Muslims of Saudi Arabia.

After the siege of the Grand Mosque was put down, the jihadis' connection to the influential Saudi clerics was unearthed and the individual imams were identified by Saudi intelligence. The king then invited them to the palace, where instead of having them incarcerated or beheaded, he made them an offer that was difficult to refuse. He proposed a new compact: The propagation of jihadist ideology within the country, on Islamic soil—*dar al Islam*—would be utterly *haram,* or forbidden. In exchange for a promise that the ideology would never again threaten the kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the house of Saud, the government would support its propagation in infidel lands (dar *al harb*) around the globe. This commitment, backed by a massive influx of petrodollars, made the kingdom the most important force behind the spread of fundamentalist and radicalized Islamic ideology around the world.

The third pivotal event of 1979 was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24. The Marxist government of Afghanistan, a Muslim nation, was battling an internal threat from indigenous fundamentalist groups. Afghans had become increasingly discontent with the regime's socialist reforms, and by December 1979 ancient clans and tribes of skilled warriors were attacking government institutions and assets. Having signed a treaty of friendship with the Afghan regime the year before, the Soviet Union decided it was time to step in and assist its "ally." Thirty thousand troops rolled in on Christmas Eve, a number that would grow to a hundred thousand.

While the upheavals in Iran and Saudi Arabia had an important psychological effect on future jihadists, the conflict in Afghanistan had the most direct influence on modern jihad. It was there that the ideas of a global jihad were forged and the original jihadist army coalesced, in no small part

because of the massive resources that poured in from America and Saudi Arabia to support the indigenous mujahideen. In his essay "Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations," Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's boss and the real founder of Al Qaeda, attested to the importance of the Afghan holy war:

> Some thought that the Earth had become devastated and that this *ummah* had been drained of the thirst for martyrdom. Therefore, Allah exploded the Jihad on the land of Afghanistan and groups of youths from the Islamic World marched forth to Afghanistan in search of Jihad and martyrdom.
>
> The Jihad initially began as a few drops, until Allah decided to ignite the sparks within this blessed people and explode the Jihad, blessing with it the land of Afghanistan and the rest of the Muslims until its good encompassed the whole World.

Azzam, bin Laden, and their small band of Arabs—no more than a few hundred—transformed a conflict between Moscow and the tribes of Afghanistan into a global movement for Islamic jihad in which Muslims of different languages, cultures, and countries coalesced into one brotherhood in pursuit of one objective—the victory of Islam and the word of Allah across the earth. Without Azzam's new ideas about jihad, legitimized by his scholarly prestige, and bin Laden's access to millions of dollars in funding, Afghanistan's jihad might have stayed within its borders. Together, these two men were able to take their enterprise global and start a fire that still rages today, more incandescent than ever.

ABDULLAH AZZAM: THE SCHOLAR MARTYR

Abdullah Azzam was born into a Palestinian family who had to flee the West Bank after the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. He became a disciple of the Muslim Brotherhood, studying during his formative years the incendiary works of its founder, Hassan al Banna (1906–1949) and those of Sayyid Qutb, finding in them the expression of his own rage and sense of victimhood. Studying in Syria and Egypt and teaching in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, he came into contact with the leading Islamist

movements of the day, weaving their disparate intellectual threads together into a cohesive doctrine, which he eventually published in 1984 as a fatwa titled *Defense of the Muslim Lands.*

The foundational work for the global jihad of the twentieth century, Azzam's *Defense* contains the key assertions at the heart of every jihadist enterprise:

- Muslims have been humiliated at the hands of impure regimes and colonial powers.
- Islam will suffer ultimate defeat if Muslims do not take on jihad as a personal obligation.
- The only way for Islam to be saved is for the caliphate to be reestablished for the glory of Allah.

Muslims are the people who have been entrusted with the final revelation of God, Azzam writes, and Islam is the only religion destined for the whole of humanity. Yet Muslims have been humiliated and subjugated. The unclean, the polytheists, those who do not believe in Allah, he says,

> have duped the dull masses of Muslims by installing their wooden-headed puppets as false figureheads of states that remain under their control.
>
> Colonialism has taken on a new face.
>
> They have come from every horizon to share us amongst them like callers to a feast. There is no greater humiliation for the people expected to lead humanity to redemption.

The unbelievers have thus joined together to humiliate the Muslims, and the only way Muslims can fight back is to come together under a unified caliphate "in order to make victorious Allah's religion of Islamic monotheism."

Defense of the Muslim Lands begins with an epigraph justifying violent jihad in the words of Mohammed: "But those who are killed in the Way of Allah, He will never let their deeds be lost." If there were any doubt about Azzam's emphasis on martyrdom in service to Allah, he clarified it in his "Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations":

> History does not write its lines except with blood. Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls. Honor and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses.

For Azzam, nothing is more honorable than for a Muslim to die fighting in the collective effort to reestablish the caliphate. In the short term, however, he was concerned about drawing more fighters to Afghanistan, so in *Defense of the Muslim Lands* he emphasizes the personal obligation of every Muslim to jihad. Insisting that his call for universal holy war is supported by a wide array of Muslim scholars, he details the lengthy process he went through to get this approval. During the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, he recalls, he delivered a lecture before more than one hundred scholars from around the Muslim world, "from whom there was not a single objection."

This broad scholarly support of Azzam's teaching was important for two reasons. The approval of the *ulema,* the learned men and scholars, established the validity of his fatwa before the Muslim world. At the same time, it showed that support for Azzam's notion of jihad extended far beyond the "Arab mujahideen," the foreign jihadis fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. The scholars Azzam consulted may not have joined him on the battlefield, but their approval allowed his call to jihad to resonate across the globe. As one scholar wrote in his endorsement of the fatwa, "Therefore it is incumbent upon every Muslim today, capable of carrying a weapon, to march forward to jihad to aid his or her Muslim brothers in Afghanistan and in every place in need, even though his or her parents do not permit it. . . ."

Azzam himself understood the crucial role of ideologues in the battle. He knew victory could not be achieved by the sword alone. Expounding on the *Hadith,* the stories and sayings of Mohammed, he stated that "the ink of the scholar is worth more than the blood of the martyr." He continued:

> Indeed nations are only brought to life by their beliefs and their concepts, and they die only with their desires and their lusts.
>
> The life of the Muslim *ummah* is solely dependent on the ink of its scholars and the blood of its martyrs.

> What is more beautiful than the writing of the *ummah*'s history with both the ink of a scholar and his blood, such that the map of Islamic history becomes colored with two lines: one of them black, and that is what the scholar wrote with the ink of his pen; and the other one red, and that is what the martyr wrote with his blood.
>
> And something more beautiful than this is when the blood is one and the pen is one, so that the hand of the scholar which expends the ink and moves the pen, is the same as the hand which expends its blood and moves the *ummah.*
>
> The extent to which the number of martyred scholars increases is the extent to which nations are delivered from their slumber, rescued from their decline, and awoken from their sleep.

Like other ideologues before him, Azzam appreciated the importance of ideas and beliefs on the battlefield. People, he knew, will not fight for territory or treasure alone; they have to believe in the righteousness of their cause. It was Azzam who would elaborate the ultimate justice of jihad and provide the rationale for thousands, indeed tens of thousands, to join the battle for Allah against the infidels.

Azzam's influence stretched well beyond the Afghan war. Even after he was assassinated in Pakistan in 1989, his call to universal war strengthened and catalyzed Al Qaeda's growth into a global brand, eventually spawning ISIS and, in 2014, the creation of the new Islamic State—the caliphate reborn.

Elaborating on the importance of Azzam in launching the global jihadist movement, the publishers of the English-language version of *Defense of the Muslim Lands* write in their introduction:

> Abdullah Azzam was greatly influenced by the Jihad in Afghanistan and the Jihad was greatly influenced by him. To it he concentrated his full effort, that he ultimately became the most prominent figure in the Afghani Jihad aside from the Afghan leaders. He spared no effort to promote the Afghan cause to the whole world, especially throughout the Muslim ummah. . . . He changed the minds of Muslims about Jihad in Afghanistan and

> *presented the Jihad as an Islamic cause which concerns all Muslims around the world* [emphasis added].
>
> Due to his efforts, the Afghani Jihad became universal, in which Muslims from every part of the world came to fight.

Azzam had dedicated his own life to jihad, and his clerical credentials were impeccable. His doctorate in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), which gave him full authority to issue fatwas, was from the most important theological institution in the Sunni world, the Al Azhar in Cairo. His prestige was one reason that *Defense of the Muslim Lands,* from the time it was issued until the summer of 2014, when ISIS reestablished the caliphate, was the modern jihadi movement's most effective tool for mobilizing support.

Another reason was that the logic of Azzam's fatwa was flawless.

Azzam had translated the geopolitical crisis of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan into a religious mandate for action. The USSR was a *kuffar,* an infidel nation, and the worst kind—driven by an atheist dogma that denied not only Allah but all transcendental truth. This infidel superpower had invaded *dar al Islam,* sacred Muslim land. The government in Kabul may have been made up of socialists, but the nation was part of the *Khorasan,* ancient Islamic territory. Its invasion by infidel forces demanded that the global community of Muslims wage a holy war to repel the *kuffar* invaders.

Azzam reasoned that because there was no caliph to declare jihad against the USSR or any other infidel group, Muslims could not wait for direction from the outside. No longer an action declared by an imperial leader, jihad was thus "democratized." Azzam's fatwa became the most important document sanctioning and requiring holy Islamic war for the next three decades.

While Abdullah Azzam forms one pillar of modern jihad, Osama bin Laden forms the other. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought Azzam into the foreign fighter movement, and the first Gulf War, a dozen years later, propelled his onetime deputy, bin Laden, to the leadership of a global terror organization targeting America and American interests around the world.

The scion of a prominent Saudi family—his father was one of the wealthiest building contractors in the desert nation and a friend of the king

—Osama bin Laden was working for the family firm when radicals stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca. While he had likely come into contact with the ideas of Sayyid Qutb as well as with Azzam, he was not yet fully radicalized, and he saw the siege as a treasonous act against a legitimate Islamic government. But when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan one month later, something snapped. He later told an interviewer, "When the invasion of Afghanistan started, I was enraged and went there at once. I arrived within days, before the end of 1979." Though it is improbable that he actually arrived in Afghanistan "within days" of the Soviet invasion, it is likely that he traveled there in great secrecy to deliver support for the mujahideen from wealthy Gulf donors, keeping his family in the dark about his mission.

Azzam was the older, revered scholar and teacher, while bin Laden was a twenty-three-year-old ascetic with access to many millions of dollars in funds from his own family and from donors throughout the Middle East. By the early 1980s, bin Laden was a conduit for external funding and a key figure in the recruitment of fighters, bringing thousands of men through Pakistan to Afghanistan in support of the holy war against the atheist Soviet Union.

The pairing of Azzam and bin Laden was critical to the success of the enterprise. Azzam was not the first to talk about jihad, but with bin Laden's financial and operational assistance, he gave the ideology a longer reach than it had ever had before. The Saudis and many other Arab Muslims felt an obligation to support the jihad for religious purposes, and bin Laden could facilitate their support. At the same time, the United States was providing covert support to the indigenous mujahideen of Afghanistan to weaken the Soviet regime. For the time being, the interest of the capitalist West coincided with that of the Wahhabi fundamentalists. Both saw the Soviet Union as their enemy.

By the end of the 1980s, having lost more than fourteen thousand soldiers in a vicious unconventional war in a region that had brought defeat to invaders as disparate as Alexander the Great and the British Empire, the Kremlin decided that the war in Afghanistan was no longer worth it. American Stinger missiles, Pakistani intelligence, and small arms from China had made the local Afghan fighters a force to be reckoned with. In

the view of the new Soviet premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, they could not be defeated without inordinate cost to the USSR.

But the "Arab Muj," who had come from outside Afghanistan to fight in this new holy war, especially Osama bin Laden, would draw another conclusion. Less than a year after the last Soviet troop convoy had left the territory of Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, the leader of the MAK, the organization that had recruited more than fifty-five thousand foreign fighters to come and wage war in Afghanistan, was dead, and bin Laden inherited the jihadi organization that would soon become Al Qaeda. But bin Laden had a different interpretation of what had just happened in Afghanistan—what it meant for the future of all Muslims and the fight against infidels everywhere.

For the wealthy Saudi, who had just spent a decade in a war zone fighting the overwhelmingly more numerous and better equipped Soviets, there was only one way to interpret the victory of the jihadists: they truly were warriors of Allah, true mujahideen, fighters in a holy war supported by God. There was no other way to explain the victory over the superior forces of a superpower. It would be inconceivable for bin Laden and his ilk to conclude that the war was in fact won because another infidel superpower, the United States, had facilitated the victory of the local Afghans through a covert program supported by his lazy countrymen safe and sound back in Saudi Arabia. His certainty that the Arab mujahideen were now vindicated as God's own fighters eventually spurred bin Laden to broaden his jihadi horizons. But only after another war broke out.

The following year saw Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invade Kuwait. His occupation of the neighboring nation also put the Saudi kingdom and its royal family at risk, as many believed that after the fall of Kuwait, Saddam would next invade Saudi Arabia. By this point Osama was losing faith in the elite of his homeland, but the king had been a close friend of his father's, and far more important than that, Saudi Arabia was the home to the holiest and most precious sites in all Islam, the cities of Mecca and Medina, where Mohammed had established the first caliphate. The kingdom had to be protected from Saddam Hussein, a Baathist thug who modeled himself more on Stalin than Mohammed.

Bin Laden met with King Fahd and the Saudi defense minister, asking them not to depend on non-Muslim (infidel) assistance from the United

States and offering to defend Saudi Arabia with his own legion of seasoned Arab mujahideen. But the king declined and instead invited America and its allies to deploy their troops to the Arabian Peninsula. This deployment, however, required a fatwa, issued by the royal court's domesticated clerics, the first of its kind in Islamic history. Although stationing infidel troops in the land of Mecca and Medina had been utterly *haram,* or forbidden, since the time of the first caliphate, now it was decreed permissible. For bin Laden, this meant the crusaders were back, but this time they had been invited by the king himself. Islam had been betrayed and sullied by its own royal leadership. This decision changed the world, moving bin Laden to turn his guerrilla band into an international terror organization that would bring jihad to the streets of America.

Bin Laden now began publicly to denounce the king, his father's close friend, as a lackey of the infidels. Attempts to silence him failed, and eventually he was banished from the kingdom and stripped of his Saudi citizenship. After the Gulf War, he moved to Sudan and took his organization—renamed Al Qaeda, "The Base"—with him.

Al Qaeda now had a new target. Instead of killing infidels who had dared to invade Muslim lands, as with the Soviets in Afghanistan, the holy war would be taken directly to the infidel, either in his own land or in locations abroad that offered an easy target.

While the operations against the infidels were planned in secret, bin Laden decided to come out of the shadows and publicly issue a fatwa of his own, *Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,* urging all Muslims, just as his mentor Abdullah Azzam had, to take up the fight and become jihadis themselves. Al Qaeda may have been born in the mountains and villages of Central Asia in a war with an occupying military, but now the enemy was everywhere, its ranks including office workers in New York, embassy employees in Africa, and off-duty American sailors in Yemen. The following decade would witness the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the suicide attack against the USS *Cole* in the Port of Aden in 1999.

Modern jihad had finally gone global. And then came September 11, 2001.

CHAPTER 4

THE ENEMY MASTERMINDS: THE GRAND STRATEGISTS OF MODERN JIHAD

Just as one must study Clausewitz, Machiavelli, and Napoleon to understand the modern Western way of war, so one must be intimately acquainted with certain key jihadi writers and thinkers if one wishes to defeat our current enemy. We have already mentioned Osama bin Laden's mentor Abdullah Azzam, who, in the absence of a caliph with the authority formally to declare holy war against the Soviets, played a pivotal role in mobilizing Muslims to become jihadists with his fatwa *Defense of the Muslim Lands*.

To understand the strategy of today's global jihadist movement, however, one must understand the work of a handful of other Islamists who wrote the most important strategic texts on war against the infidel—Sayyid Qutb; Ayman al Zawahiri, the current head of Al Qaeda; Brigadier General S. K. Malik; and the late American Al Qaeda leader Anwar al Awlaki. The works of these "big picture" Islamist thinkers shape the actions and plans of all of today's jihadist terror groups, from Boko Haram to Al Qaeda, from the al Nusra Front to the Islamic State.

MILESTONES: ALL MUST FIGHT FOR THE CALIPHATE

Sayyid Qutb, a minor Egyptian government official, wrote the most influential modern text on jihad. His 1964 book *Milestones* (sometimes translated as *Signposts along the Way)* has become the field manual for

jihadists everywhere and remains a core doctrinal text for the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Qutb was a key member.

Written after Qutb visited the United States on an exchange program soon after World War II, the book explains why Muslims have lost their preeminent position in the world and argues that the godless, infidel nation of the United States must be destroyed to rid the world of *jahiliyyah,* the pagan ignorance of Allah, which has once again infected the minds and souls of Muslims across the globe.

This violent purification of the world and the reestablishment of Islamic greatness in the theocratic empire that was the caliphate depend on holy war, or jihad. Qutb is quite explicit about his belief that Islam is not merely a religion but also a "revolutionary party" with a political mission to mobilize the masses and capture global power for the glory of Allah. Islam is more than a matter of personal belief. Again and again in this short book, Qutb insists that Islam has a mandate to re-create the caliphate, this time as a theocratic empire that will span the world.

It is not surprising, then, that *Milestones* lifts heavily and frequently from other revolutionary ideologies, especially fascism and communism. Qutb (and later bin Laden) often used Marxist terminology such as the "vanguard" to explain the special role of the small minority of "enlightened" religious revolutionaries.

Eventually arrested for his central role in the Brotherhood and involvement in a plot to kill President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qutb was executed in August 1966. His ideas on jihad and religious war live on, however. *Milestones* is found all over the Middle East, in many Islamic "cultural centers" across the United States, and, significantly, in the possession of high-value jihadist targets on the battlefield and of terrorists apprehended here in America.

Qutb's ideas link insurgent leaders like Abu Bakr al Baghdadi of ISIS with individual terrorists like the Tsarnaev brothers, the Boston Marathon bombers, all of whom concur with the fundamental analysis of *Milestones:*

1. Today's Muslims are like the pagan Arab tribes of Mecca in the time of Mohammed.
2. They have failed to submit to the will of Allah in part because their leaders are themselves false Muslims and puppets of the

West, and also because they have been corrupted by the heretical values of the infidel.
3. As a result, there is no true Islamic state today, only pretense and falsehood.
4. The answer is a return to Allah and the reestablishment of his sovereignty on earth through the re-creation of his theocratic caliphate in a jihad.

For Qutb, being a Muslim is not a personal, theoretical, or individualistic exercise. You're a true Muslim only if you join in eradicating the infidel and all his influences and do your part in the war to bring back the Islamic empire.

ZAWAHIRI: ONE SUPERPOWER DOWN, ONE TO GO

Ayman al Zawahiri (born 1951), who took over Al Qaeda after bin Laden's death, has actually made a more important contribution to the canon of jihadi strategy than his former boss did.

A physician from a prominent Cairo family, Zawahiri was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood like Qutb but later became one of the leaders of the terror group Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Also arrested and imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities for his extreme beliefs and personal goal of bringing down the Cairo government, Zawahiri was eventually released and ended up in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, treating the mujahideen who had been wounded fighting the Russians.

In Pakistan, Zawahiri met Osama bin Laden and was drawn deeper into the world of the "Arab mujahideen," eventually becoming a member of the MAK, or Services Bureau. After the head of the MAK, Abdullah Azzam, was killed in 1989 and bin Laden took over the organization, the puritanical Wahhabi ideology began to mingle with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, transforming MAK into Al Qaeda—"the Base"—with Zawahiri as bin Laden's new deputy.

Bin Laden and Zawahiri gave the renamed jihadi group a new and global mission. Instead of targeting only foreign invaders on Muslim soil or un-Islamic apostate Arab leaders and their governments in the Middle East, the Base would attack both. And, most important for America, Al Qaeda

would now take the jihad into the heart of infidel lands. This move into "enemy territory" would eventually result in Al Qaeda's managing to do what no other jihadist group had ever achieved.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood's declaration back in the 1920s that the caliphate must be reestablished—by force if need be—scores of jihadist groups had been founded around the globe, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, from Africa to Central Asia. Some had been more successful than others, the Brotherhood itself jeopardizing the stability of several Arab nations through assassinations and sundry subversions and conspiracies. But each one was stymied by its shortsighted focus on the proximate infidel or apostate enemy. Whether it was Egyptian Islamic Jihad trying to take down the secular government in Cairo or jihadist groups fighting the "heathen" Indians in Kashmir, they were all limited by their operational parochialism. This would change under bin Laden and Zawahiri, as Al Qaeda became the self-appointed "vanguard" of a global movement that would eventually, on September 11, 2001, stun the world.

Al Qaeda now retooled itself along three fronts:

- Exporting jihadists to new guerrilla theaters around the world;
- Becoming the global face of jihad through propaganda; and
- Establishing cells across the world to execute terrorist attacks against the infidel.

In the 1990s, Al Qaeda recruited new jihadi fighters and deployed them to Bosnia in the Balkans, Chechnya in the Russian Federation, Kashmir in India, and all significant war zones where Muslims were fighting non-Muslims. Bin Laden would periodically emerge from the shadows of the war in Afghanistan to record video and audio messages for a global audience of willing holy warriors, eventually becoming an international media personality, interviewed on CNN and ABC.

At the same time, bin Laden and Zawahiri were recruiting Muslim fundamentalists not only to become guerrilla fighters but to join clandestine terrorist cells embedded in Western infidel nations or places where there were enough infidels to make a target-rich environment. Establishing its network in more than fifty nations, Al Qaeda was able to take the holy war to the *kuffar* again and again in the 1990s. Bin Laden and Zawahiri were

responsible for or connected with the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the bombings of American embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the attack on the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000.

Despite these successful attacks, the United States was utterly surprised on September 11, 2001, by the deadliest terrorist attack in history, an attack that catapulted Al Qaeda to a position of worldwide prominence that other jihadist groups had only dreamt of.

Throughout this period, and especially after the 9/11 attacks, when Al Qaeda was discussed it was bin Laden who garnered all the popular attention, and for obvious reasons, since he was the leader of the group, and also because he fit the stereotype of the ascetic jihadi warrior. But this focus on bin Laden obscured Zawahiri's role as the real ideological master of Al Qaeda. It was the older Egyptian jihadist who had studied and honed his theological and rhetorical skills in the dock of the Egyptian court system and the prisons of Cairo. His efforts to engage online with other Muslims to explain and justify the new global campaign of terror were crucial to spreading Al Qaeda's name among potentially sympathetic Muslims around the world.

Anticipating the reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the worldwide attention they would bring, Zawahiri penned a semiautobiographical book on his experience of jihad, making the case that the time had come for all to choose sides in the religious war to end all wars. *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* appeared online two months after the attacks and was published in book form by an Arabic outlet in London, Ash-Sharq al Awsat. Also known colloquially as "Warriors under the Flag of Mohammed," the book builds upon the themes of both Qutb and Azzam, reformulating them for the new age of holy war in which Al Qaeda is the global jihadi "brand" for the twenty-first century.

Zawahiri argues that Islam must rejuvenate itself with an assault on all that is un-Islamic and that this revival to greatness will come through each believer's taking up the sword of jihad. The time has come for each man to choose which side of history he will live or die on. The Arab mujahideen of Afghanistan, the founders of Al Qaeda, have shown the way. In the 1980s, there were two global superpowers. One, the Soviet Union, was foolish enough to invade Muslim land when it deployed its troops in Afghanistan, inciting the "best Muslims" to fight in a holy war against the *kuffar*

invaders. And despite being outnumbered and outgunned, the jihadists won, a feat possible only because they were fighting for Allah. Two years after the mujahideen's victory in Afghanistan, their enemy imploded when the USSR was dissolved, on Christmas Day 1991. Now, at the dawn of a new century, there is only one infidel superpower left standing, the United States, and it too will fall to the sword of Allah's army.

The final message of *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* is very simple: God is on the side of the jihadists. Their eventual victory over all disbelief, including the destruction of America, is inevitable.[1] The members of the human race have one simple choice to make: join the "caravan of jihad" or be destroyed.

GENERAL MALIK: WAR AGAINST THE SOUL OF THE INFIDEL

The ideological and strategic thinker of greatest importance to the global jihadi movement today is one most people, even members of the American intelligence community, have never heard of.

In 1979, that year of turmoil in Tehran, Mecca, and Kabul, an astonishing book was published in Pakistan by Brigadier General S. K. Malik under the title *The Quranic Concept of War*. The book is remarkable not only for its direct connection to later events like 9/11 and its rationalization of such heinous acts but also for its highly original, indeed revolutionary, analysis. For *The Quranic Concept of War* is unlike any strategic work in the canon of Western military thought.

Malik destroys the central tenets of Western military thought, especially the seminal theories of Carl von Clausewitz. Ever since he analyzed the earth-shattering campaigns of Napoleon, Western military academies and war colleges have taught as holy writ the Prussian's dictum that war is an instrument of the nation-state, a violent tool to be used in the furtherance of the national interest when all other tools fail. We teach that war is simply an extension of policy, that war is politics with a gun, or as Clausewitz originally put it, "the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means."

Upending centuries of military doctrine, Malik states that war has nothing to do with the nation-state—which is in any case a heretical construct of the infidel West—or with serving the nation or earthbound politics. War serves only one purpose: the realization of Allah's sovereignty here on earth. According to the Pakistani general, all war must serve only the objective of re-creating the caliphate, the theocratic empire of Islam, so that Allah's writ may once again reign supreme.

Malik's next challenge to Western strategic thought is his rejection of the way the infidel goes to war. When American or allied forces ready themselves for war, they perform what is called an "intelligence preparation of the battlefield."[2] This analysis serves in part to identify what are termed "key vulnerabilities" or "centers of gravity" within the enemy's forces and infrastructure—those targets whose destruction will most incapacitate the enemy or force his surrender. Malik states that the infidel's concept of multiple centers of gravity or key vulnerabilities in war is just as fallacious as the idea that war serves political purposes. According to the Pakistani general, there is only one target of importance in war: the soul of the enemy. The infidel foe must be converted to Islam or crushed.

Lastly, since the only target that matters in war is the soul of the infidel, Malik concludes that the most effective weapon in war is terror. Here we see the relevance of his book to groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. The enemy's belief system must be utterly destroyed, and terror is the most effective way to do that. That is why 9/11 was so important. It is the highly symbolic suicide attacks, the crucifixions, the beheadings, the bombings of civilian crowds, and the videos of immolations that will destroy the will of the infidel to go on.

Lest anyone think *The Quranic Concept of War* was a product of the radical and disenchanted fringe of the Pakistani military, it must be noted that the book was published with a foreword by General M. Zia ul Haq, chief of the army staff and the president of Pakistan, who affirms that jihad in the cause of Allah "is not the exclusive domain of the professional soldier," echoing Azzam's fatwa declaring holy war an obligation of all Muslim believers.

The works by Qutb, Zawahiri, and Malik have been found on high-value targets and jihadi leaders in every theater of "holy war." The ideas of

these strategic thinkers and those of Ibn Taymiyya, Mawdudi, and Azzam have shaped the worldview and objectives of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and every jihadist terror group working today to restore the caliphate so Islam can reign supreme. But when it comes to the threat of jihadi violence here in the United States and the danger of American citizens' becoming terrorists, there is one more figure we must discuss.

AWLAKI: LEAVE OR KILL

Born in New Mexico in 1971 to Yemeni parents, Anwar al Awlaki would become the spiritual leader for a new generation of terrorists. Nicknamed "the bin Laden of the Internet," Awlaki was trained in Islamic theology and became the imam of the Falls Church mosque in Virginia. He ended his days as one of the most senior leaders of Al Qaeda, killed on the orders of the White House in a drone strike in 2011.

Awlaki, whose influence continues even after his death thanks to his scores of videos and audio recordings, applied his understanding of American culture and society to the challenge of recruiting young Americans to the cause of jihad, making holy war attractive to a post–Afghan War generation. His efforts were especially important after the 9/11 attacks provoked a robust American national security response, making the execution of similar attacks by Arabs from the Middle East traveling in the United States much harder.

Awlaki was in contact with Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood mass-murderer, and his influence can be found in the attempted Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad and the Christmas Day bomb plot of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. But his importance is illustrated best by his ideological and theological role in the Boston Marathon bombing, the deadliest post-9/11 terrorist attack until the San Bernardino massacre in 2015.

I had the honor to serve as an expert for the U.S. Attorney's Office in the preparations for the trial of the surviving killer, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. I was given access to the jihadi materials found on his hard drive, documents disclosed during the court proceedings that vividly reveal the living, breathing threat of jihadi terrorism in America.

Tsarnaev had multiple issues of the Al Qaeda magazine *Inspire* downloaded from the Internet, as well as a series of audio lectures by Anwar al Awlaki titled *Hereafter,* focusing on the rewards a devout Muslim will receive in heaven when he becomes *shaheed,* a martyr in the cause of the caliphate.

A 2010 issue of *Inspire* contains an article by Awlaki, "Shaykh Anwar's Message to the American People and the Muslims of the West," which includes this key statement:

> I for one, was born in the U.S. and lived in the U.S. for 21 years. America was my home. I was a preacher of Islam involved in non-violent Islamic activism. However, with the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that *jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim* [emphasis added].

Most significantly, Awlaki offers an operational choice to Muslims living in un-Islamic countries such as America, a choice based upon the principle of *al wala wal bara.* Originally simply a call to do that which pleases Allah and reject that which Allah would not like, that principle, Awlaki tells the Muslims of America and the West, now has broader implications:

> To the Muslims in America I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims?
>
> Hence, my advice to you is this: *you have two choices: either hijra* [migration] *or jihad. You either leave or you fight* [emphasis added]. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers in the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.

Awlaki was the catalyst for several of the most serious attacks and jihadi conspiracies on U.S. soil after 9/11. His message, transmitted in professional and attractive media, appealed to American citizens and immigrants in ways that the old-fashioned and stolid preaching of the senior Al Qaeda figures never could.

The message of holy war is alive. Its strength is evident in the decision of the Al Qaeda offshoot Al Qaeda in Iraq—now known as ISIS, the Islamic State—that the time for caliphate is here. ISIS will not stop until it is destroyed or it destroys us. There is no negotiating with totalitarians, especially religious totalitarians who see the rest of the world as infidels to be converted, enslaved, or killed.

We have been losing this war since 2001—spectacularly, in fact, with tens of thousands killed around the world in the name of Allah and now in the name of the new caliphate of ISIS and its new emperor, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Jihad has become a threat to all that is decent in the world and above all to America, the nation that embodies the values of individual liberty that are antithetical to the global jihadi movement. So what is to be done? How do we win?

We learn from the lessons of the last war we fought against totalitarians, the Cold War we won against communism. Following George Kennan, we must first understand the threat, and then we must craft a strategic response, like Paul Nitze's NSC-68, to crush our enemy.

CHAPTER 5

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? HOW AMERICA WINS AND THE JIHADIS LOSE

The year 2015 saw the highest number of jihadi plots on American soil since September 11, 2001.[1] And by far the greatest number of those attacks were connected to the Islamic State, the new caliphate.

After the carnage of recent years, it is clear that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi has a plan to destroy anyone who gets in the way of the caliphate or fails to submit to the new empire of Islam. His plan is an updated version of the strategies of Qutb, Azzam, and Malik, whose works helped establish the global jihadist movement of which Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are just the newest members. But this time the purveyors of holy war have leveraged the apocalyptic aspects of Islam in such a way as to turn their organization into a juggernaut of jihad. As a result, the Islamic State is the most powerful threat group of its kind in history, let alone among jihadi groups.

It is time to speak truthfully about the threat to America, as George Kennan did at the beginning of the Cold War, to understand who the enemy is and why it is so dangerous. Then we can finally draw a plan to destroy that enemy and secure the nation.

WHO IS THE ENEMY? A "LONG TELEGRAM" FOR THE JIHADIS

In the postwar world, the existential threat to America came from communism—in particular from the Soviet Union, the most powerful embodiment of that totalitarian ideology. The existential threat to America today comes from the global jihadi movement, of which the Islamic State is the most dangerous expression. In fact, it is by far the most dangerous irregular warfare organization ever, as we know from four unclassified metrics.[2]

1. The Islamic State: the world's first trans-regional insurgency

In the years after 9/11, Al Qaeda, the group responsible for those attacks, never functioned as a true insurgency, mobilizing its own mass base of support. Instead it attached itself like a parasite to existing insurgencies, such as Al Shabaab in Somalia and the Taleban in Afghanistan, to further its own aims. ISIS is different. It has not relied on other, indigenous organizations.

After Abu Bakr al Baghdadi broke from Al Qaeda, he began to recruit his own group of fighters from the local populations in Iraq and Syria and also from all over the world. Latest estimates have the Islamic State at more than seventy-five thousand fighters, with half of those recruited from outside the region and coming from over a hundred nations. Six thousand of these jihadis have come to ISIS from Western nations on Western passports that afford them great freedom of movement.

Successful recruiting has enabled ISIS to capture territory in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The land under ISIS control today is more extensive than Great Britain, encompassing more than six million persons and some of the biggest cities in the region.

More important, dozens of groups from all over the world, including the lethal Nigerian jihadi movement Boko Haram, have pledged *bayat,* or fealty, to the new caliph, Baghdadi. And after Boko Haram, which killed more than six thousand people in 2014 alone, was accepted into the caliphate, it changed its name to the West Africa Province of the Islamic State. The large swaths of land under Boko Haram's control are now de facto part of the new caliphate (and also arguably de jure from the perspective of sharia law). The Islamic State is thus the first insurgency in human history to hold territory not only in multiple countries in one region but in multiple countries in multiple regions.[3]

2. The Islamic State: the richest jihadist group *ever*

The most successful insurgency in history is also the richest substate threat group of its kind we have ever seen. The Islamic State does not have to rely upon donations from sympathizers or rich donors as Al Qaeda did. It makes millions of dollars every day from its own criminal activities and from the caliphate's governmental operations. Its major sources of funding are illicit sales from captured oil fields, hostage taking, racketeering, the sale of rare antiquities on the black market, and the formal taxation of the population living within the caliphate. The *Financial Times,* whose reporters have researched the "GDP" of the Islamic State, estimates that these income streams brought in $500 million in 2015, a figure that comports closely with the unclassified U.S. government estimates that the Islamic State makes $2 to $4 million per day.

To the income generated by those activities, we should also add the funds ISIS accrued from its earlier raids on the Iraqi National Bank. In 2014, in two operations, ISIS fighters stole a total of $823 million from the government of Iraq. A comparison with the finances of Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks puts this figure in perspective.

The official 9/11 Commission report, which included an in-depth financial forensic analysis of the attacks, concluded that the whole operation—everything from student visas to living expenses for the nineteen terrorists in the United States, flight school tuition, and the purchase of the box cutters and plane tickets—cost Al Qaeda just $500,000. And with that amount of money, Al Qaeda managed to inflict a billion dollars' worth of damage on U.S. financial markets and the national economy in just the first twelve months after the attacks. By comparison, the Islamic State's two bank raids netted it 1,600 times what Al Qaeda spent on 9/11. Once ISIS consolidates its hold on the territory it has captured in the Middle East and Africa, it has the resources, should it focus its attention on America, to make the 9/11 attacks seem like a small incident.

3. A deadly combination: belief in Armageddon and social media expertise

The reason that ISIS has succeeded in reestablishing the caliphate is its paradoxical combination of the old and the new. ISIS believes it is different from the jihadi movements that have gone before it and has managed to convince tens of thousands of followers of the same.

To this day, people in Washington can't even agree about what to call this group. Some refer to it as ISIS—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Others, such as President Obama, refer to it as ISIL—the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[4] Yet in reality neither name is correct.

In war, names matter. An intelligence preparation of the battlefield does not describe enemies capriciously. The way we talk about our foes is a function of the raw intelligence we put into the system, and the names we give them are a reflection of what they call themselves. We called the Third Reich the Third Reich because that was what the Nazis called themselves. The same was true with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. If we wish to be accurate, we should refer to our current enemy as the "Islamic State." That is what they have called themselves since Abu Bakr al Baghdadi declared the caliphate reborn in the summer of 2014. And indeed such major publications as the *Financial Times* and the *Economist* refer to the jihadi group as IS.[5]

But to truly understand our enemy and how it has been so successful, we must look to what it called itself before it became the Islamic State. Originally, this small group of jihadists was called Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mesopotamian franchise of the original Al Qaeda, led by the Jordanian thug Abu Musab al Zarqawi until he was killed by U.S. forces. Then, after Abu Bakr al Baghdadi became its leader and the group left Iraq to fight and recruit in Syria, it gave itself a new name: the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Shaam.[6] But what is "Al Shaam," and why is this phrase so important?

Al Shaam literally means "the land that rises from the sea." On one level, it is simply a geographic designation for that portion of the Middle East that we would call Greater Syria or the Levant. This is the origin of Washington's preferred names for the Islamic State, ISIS and ISIL. But this is only a fraction of the significance of Al Shaam.

Like Judaism, Christianity, or any other major religion, Islam has a well-developed eschatology—the story the community tells itself about End Times. Christian eschatology, based in part on the Book of Revelation, describes a series of battles before Judgment Day between the forces of an Anti-Christ and the last Christians on earth, culminating on the plains of Megiddo (Armageddon) in northern Israel.

In a distinct parallel to the Christian story of End Times, Islamic eschatology also teaches of a diabolic figure who will lead the forces of the infidel *kuffar* in a series of great battles against the last true Muslims on earth before Allah resurrects all men and judges them. The pivotal conflict will take place in Al Shaam, and the Megiddo for Muslims is actually the territory of Syria and Iraq. Not only has Abu Bakr al Baghdadi named his fighting force of holy warriors after a location with powerful religious significance for all Muslims, he and his men have managed to capture this land and rebuild the caliphate on it.

Every time Baghdadi gives a sermon on YouTube about his victories in Al Shaam or his propagandists around the globe refer to his organization as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Shaam, they are sending a subtle but powerful message to every young Muslim man—and, increasingly, to every young Muslim woman—looking for meaning, whether in Cairo, Paris, or San Bernardino. The message is:

> The final jihad has begun. Your father may have fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and your uncle may have fought for Allah in Bosnia against the Serbs and Croats in the 1990s. That indeed makes them mujahideen and they will see paradise.
>
> But if you, young man, want to cleanse your soul and acquire for yourself the only guarantee of salvation as a martyred jihadi, the final opportunity has arrived.
>
> I, Abu Bakr, the new caliph, have captured the land of Al Shaam, where the last holy war is now being fought.
>
> There will be no other wars in which you may martyr yourself for Allah and reach paradise. The caliphate is finally back. Join us now!

It is impossible to explain the almost forty thousand young men who have left their homes to fight for the Islamic State unless you understand how it has leveraged the centuries-old eschatology of the religion and combined it with new propaganda platforms.

The peculiar contradiction is that the Islamic State is using the latest social media tools to propagate a vision of the end of the world that

predates the telegraph, let alone the Internet. Today the Islamic State has a media presence online that makes the jihadi products of Al Qaeda look like the work of high school amateurs. Whether it is the English-language jihadi magazine *Dabiq,*[7] already on its thirteenth issue, or the videos it posts relentlessly on the web, the Islamic State is communicating in ways that perpetuate a constant stream of recruits. *Dabiq* itself is much more impressively produced and much deeper theologically than Al Qaeda's original publication, *Inspire.* But that all pales in significance when compared with the propaganda videos produced by the Islamic State.

American audiences are familiar with the scores of decapitation videos that have been placed on the Internet by Alhayat, ISIS's media arm. But these are always redacted for broadcast on mainstream media. Watched in their entirety, in addition to being stomach churning in their gruesome violence, they are masterly works of psychological warfare and propaganda.

As part of my own research, I watched one of the early ISIS videos with a graduate of one of America's premier film schools. Halfway through, he paused the video, looked at me, and said, "This film was made by someone who went to one of the leading film schools in the world." So professional was the editing and the use of unusual camera angles and slow motion that he was convinced that this film was the handiwork of someone trained in a Western university. This was, of course, completely possible. An estimated six thousand young Westerners have heeded the call to jihad, and many of them bring modern media skills to a theocratic entity predicated on seventh-century fundamentalist mores.[8] But this strange marriage of the ancient and the ultramodern is in part why the Islamic State has superseded Al Qaeda as the "brand leader" of the global jihadi movement. What is worse, American and allied efforts to counter this powerful media assault have been either wholly absent or woefully inadequate.

4. The empire is back: ISIS succeeds where all others have failed.

The fourth and most important reason that ISIS is a grave threat to America is what separates it from all other jihadi groups of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We cannot begin to defeat the most dangerous member and standard-bearer of the new global jihadi movement unless we understand the significance of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's reestablishment of the caliphate, or Islamic state.

As we saw in chapter 2, the caliphate existed for over a millennium. Though it took various forms over the centuries—and some of its rulers were more pious than others—the reality of the empire of Islam had a profound effect upon how Muslims understood the world in general and how to deal with the infidel in particular. But when Ataturk, hoping to bring his fellow Muslims into the modern world by separating political power from religious faith, dissolved the caliphate after World War I, he angered Muslims who believed that separation of mosque and state is blasphemous. For these followers of Mohammed—a figure who at one and the same time was a prophet of Allah, a great military commander, and an emperor—the only way to live was within a theocratic state in which the Koran was the constitution. This belief would be the driving force behind hundreds of Islamist groups in the ensuing century, organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Taleban, and Al Qaeda, all of them adamant that the caliphate must be brought back. But all these groups failed to re-create the empire of old. That is, until June 29, 2014, when Baghdadi declared the restoration of the Islamic State with himself as the new emperor of Islam, the new caliph.

Plainly put, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and ISIS have succeeded where all other jihadists have failed. And they have done so on the territory that all Muslims have been told is the land where the final holy war with the infidel will take place: Al Shaam. This historic victory brings a symbolic and practical weight to the Islamic State, giving it a momentum against us, the infidel, that more terrestrial and politically defined foes cannot match.

Russia may be a spoiler on the international stage and China may be our economic rival and cyber-adversary, but neither is driven by an immanent vision of apocalypse based upon a historic and theological idyll familiar to more than a billion people in the world today. Even the mullahs in Iran, despite having their own version of the caliphate and an apocalyptic narrative of the return of a mystically "hidden imam," are limited in the threat they pose to America and the West. They are Shia, a minority in Islam, and the sense of Persian national identity still beating within Iranian society has no truck with suicidal ideas of Armageddon.[9]

Today no nation or other group poses a direct existential threat to America and the whole of Western civilization except the Islamic State.

Even the otherwise unpredictable and nuclear-armed North Korea is constrained by demographics, economics, and its far more powerful northerly neighbor China. For the millions of fundamentalist believers who for decades have lamented the loss of the caliphate and railed against the perversions of Western culture and the subversion of originalist Islam, Baghdadi, the new caliph, and his mujahideen have redeemed the faith for a new age that will bring purity, salvation, and glory to Allah.

And the threat cannot be dismissed as a problem only for the Middle East and the Islamic world, eight thousand miles away. It is a threat to America and all Americans. Since the rebirth of the caliphate, plot after plot has unfolded in the United States. In less than two years, more than ninety people were killed or arrested in jihadi incidents connected to ISIS.

In the plots we have intercepted, what we have learned about the division of labor in the jihadist enterprise is especially disturbing.[10] Of the ISIS terrorists arrested or interdicted inside America since the Islamic State was declared, just over half had sworn *bayat* to the new caliph and were preparing to leave the country to fight for ISIS in the Middle East. Of the rest, 19 percent were acting as talent-spotters or facilitators, like those management-level terrorists who vetted the young men and bought them their plane tickets to Turkey so they could cross into Syria to fight for the new empire. But most shocking of all, 29 percent of the ISIS supporters caught or killed in the United States saw no need to go anywhere to become a jihadi. They had decided that the best way to serve the new caliphate and the new caliph is to kill Americans here at home.

Even when we have failed to identify concrete operational ties between the Islamic State and active jihadis here in America, the significance of Baghdadi's accomplishment has been clear. We have yet to find evidence of communication between ISIS and the San Bernardino killers or the terrorist in Philadelphia who, dressed in traditional Arab garb, tried to assassinate a local police officer. But they had proclaimed their loyalty to ISIS and the new caliph.

The Islamic State is much more than a regional insurgency threatening the nations of the Middle East or Africa. It is not a "junior varsity" terror team. The Islamic State is the twenty-first-century brand of global jihad, admired and emulated from Paris to Philadelphia to San Bernardino. It is

the center of a new religious revolution that will continue to murder and devastate those it sees as the infidel, expanding and inspiring mayhem here in America—unless it is stopped.

So how should we defeat it?

HOW TO DESTROY THE NEW TOTALITARIANS

The threat of global jihadism will not "run out of steam" if we ignore it. As an infamous communist once said, the question therefore is: What is to be done? What is the role of America, the vanquisher of the previous globalist totalitarianisms of fascism and communism? For guidance, we should turn to the exemplary work of George Kennan and Paul Nitze—Kennan's Long Telegram, analyzing the postwar Soviet threat, and Nitze's top-secret NSC-68, which proposed a strategy for winning the Cold War.

Kennan's original classified telegram is easily summarized. The Soviet Union poses an existential threat to the United States because it is based upon the inherently undemocratic ideology of communism, which denies that Western democracy and communism can peacefully coexist. One must destroy the other. The USSR can never be our partner, only a deadly foe. It is not interested in peace or stability, because it sees its mandate as universal and unstoppable. According to the Kremlin, all the people in the world must eventually live under communism. The further spread of communism must be stopped, and the ideology must be undermined from within.

If George Kennan had been a senior diplomat in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad during the rise of ISIS in 2013 and had been asked to explain what was happening in the Middle East, his reply would have been practically the same as the Long Telegram. Only the names would be different. *ISIS and the broader global jihadist movement* pose an existential threat to the United States because they are based upon the inherently undemocratic ideology of *takfiri jihad,* which denies that Western democracy and *Islam* can peacefully coexist. One must destroy the other. The *jihadists* can never be our partner, only a deadly foe. They are not interested in peace or stability, because they see their mandate as universal and unstoppable. According to *Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and his Islamic State,* all the people in the world must eventually live under *the Islamic caliphate.* The further

spread of *jihadism* must be stopped, and the ideology must be undermined from within.

The fact that "jihadism" can be substituted for "USSR" in that threat analysis from seventy years ago without any loss of accuracy demonstrates what a serious threat the strategic masters of global jihad have created with their ideology of *takfirism*. The danger America faces today is simply another form of global totalitarianism, this time a religiously expressed one.

The similarities between groups like Al Qaeda or the Islamic State and USSR are too numerous and fundamental to be ignored. Both groups are driven by a totalitarian vision. The followers of Karl Marx envisioned a world transformed into a workers' paradise in which all other classes had been destroyed and only one party, the Communist Party, was in control. Today's jihadists also have a universal vision. They look forward to a global caliphate in which all have submitted to the will of Allah and live as Muslims, the infidels and apostates having been slain. Both visions are exclusive, absolutist, and totalitarian. They are predicated on a "them or us" vision of how the world must be. There is no possibility for peaceful coexistence with the "other."

For Marxists, it was an article of faith that capitalism and democracy were antithetical to socialism and that the exploitation of the working class within "market democracies" would eventually lead to the collapse of such societies and their replacement, after a revolution, with one-party communist rule. The vision of the jihadists we are fighting today is equally gloomy for the free world. Allah's sovereignty, in the form of a global caliphate, must be supreme. Coexistence with the *kuffar,* the infidel, is impossible, an affront to the Creator.

Like the communists, the jihadists lay the blame for the world's troubles at our feet. In the eyes of the Marxists, the capitalists' exploitation of the workers was the root of all evil. The West was the cause of injustice, which could be vanquished only by a revolutionary "vanguard" of true believers, to borrow a term from Lenin. The jihadists also find the West guilty. It is the West that has "declared war" against Islam by dominating the Islamic world, whether through military force in the first Gulf War and our actions in Iraq and Syria today or through our economic and cultural dominance and exploitation of Muslim and Arab lands.

As you can see, the similarities between the communists of the Cold War and the jihadists of today are multiple and fundamental. Both are ideologically driven, global in their strategic ambition, absolutist, and totalitarian. It seems more than obvious, then, that the tools used to defeat the ideological threat of communism could be extremely useful in today's fight to defeat the likes of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. But before we employ them in a new strategy for a new enemy, we should carefully note the important differences between communism and jihadism.

The most obvious difference between the two ideologies is how they view religion. Communism is violently antireligious, seeing the church as a living symbol of the "reactionary" forces of the bourgeoisie. Of course, the Islamic State sees religion as the solution, not the problem, but it has in mind one religion and one religion only—the fundamentalist and puritanical Islam of the seventh century.

Secondly, the threat of communism was very much driven by the Soviet state, while we cannot tie the threat of global jihadism to one country. Yes, the ideology of Marxism did hold that eventually there would be no governments and the world would simply belong to the working class in one utopian and egalitarian global system, but the reality was different. Even at the height of the Cold War, when communism had spread to multiple regions of the world, the monopolistic power of Moscow to control its satellites and allies was unquestioned.

A number of governments have aided and abetted the jihadist groups that have proliferated since 1979, but in the post-9/11 world, no one nation controls the threat. The rise of the Islamic State, for instance, was the result of exploiting the weaknesses of two governments at the same time, Iraq and Syria. Any plan we devise to defeat this new foe will have to take into account that our enemy is not a monolithic nationstate but a global movement of fanatical believers.

IF KENNAN AND NITZE WERE ALIVE TODAY

When President Truman understood the full weight of Kennan's analysis of the Kremlin, he made "containment" the label for America's strategic approach to the threat posed by the USSR and its allies. But how would we win this war? What would it take not only to prevent the fall of

other free nations to communism but eventually to destroy the credibility of the idea of communism itself? Those were the questions Paul Nitze addressed in his secret plan NSC-68, an objective analysis of the threat and the options available to America in the postwar world in which Soviet power was increasing. The options at the start of the Cold War were:

1. Maintain current policies, which would lead to a weakening of our allies in Europe and their possible collapse or incorporation into the Soviet sphere.
2. Isolation.
3. Initiate a preemptive nuclear war, which was against our national principles.
4. Strengthen America's allies, promote democratic values, and encourage resistance to communism, which would eventually cause communist dictatorships to crumble from within.

The Truman administration and those that followed pursued the fourth option, of course, and four decades later the Soviet bloc collapsed.

Our strategic options in today's struggle with the global jihadist movement are essentially the same. The first two are essentially to do nothing. In the wake of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, most Americans now agree that attempting to establish functioning democracies in Muslim and Arab countries is not a good idea. But the consequences of allowing ISIS to overrun state after state in the Middle East and Africa would be horrific, both for the Muslims who do not subscribe to ISIS's vision of Islam and for the Christians and other minorities who would be slaughtered or driven from their homes.

The third option is even worse. It is too late for a preemptive strike, as Osama bin Laden has already initiated the war, which Baghdadi is now continuing. But even if there had never been jihadi attacks on U.S. soil, using nuclear weapons against either the Sunni or Shia threat groups in the Middle East would be so gross a violation of American values that no president would contemplate such an option.

So what would America's fourth option look like today?

THE PLAN TO DEFEAT THE GLOBAL JIHADISTS

We must begin as Paul Nitze began, with Sun Tsu's cardinal rule of war: Know both yourself and the enemy if you want to win.

It is clear why we must go to war: because ISIS and the broader movement of which it is the new standard-bearer is globally ambitious and utterly totalitarian. But who are we? What do we represent? What are the stakes? Here we can do no better than invoke the opening passages of Nitze's NSC-68:

> The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.
>
> Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

That purpose has not changed in the past three generations. While there are powerful domestic forces at work that have pushed a collectivist political agenda, they do not have the power or the mandate to redefine America. How then will we protect that founding vision from the new totalitarians? We must attack them on three fronts.

1. Deploy the truth: you cannot win a war if you cannot talk honestly about the enemy

Since the 9/11 attacks, political correctness and ideological prejudice—under both Republican and Democratic presidents—have distorted our

analysis of the enemy, preventing us from drawing an effective plan to defeat the likes of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The Obama administration, blinded by its own preconceived ideas of why terrorism occurs, is influenced by malevolent actors who have an interest in censoring any talk of the religious aspects of the enemy's ideology. At the highest level of the U.S. government, terrorism is deemed to be the result of poverty, unemployment, and lack of political enfranchisement. This fallacy must be jettisoned.

We are not at war with Islam. The people most immanently in danger, in fact, are the nonviolent and non-extremist Muslims of the Middle East, such as our allies in Jordan and the modern Muslims of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. They are on the most important front of this war, and they understand just how much religion truly matters. We do a great disservice to those brave Muslims when we try to convince the world that the threat will disappear if enough people have good jobs and sound educations.

The next president must initiate a strategic-level counterpropaganda campaign from inside the National Security Council that has two objectives. The first is to speak openly and truthfully about the enemy, acknowledging its true identity and ideological character. To eliminate any question about where America stands in this global fight, we must use the term "jihadist" to describe groups like the Islamic State, and we must paint them as unequivocally evil. Ronald Reagan demonstrated the clarifying power of such plain speaking when he called the Soviet Union and its satellites an evil empire.

This strategic communications stance should be supported by a massive counterpropaganda campaign coordinated by the NSC across the Defense and State Departments and the intelligence community, targeting, responding to, and delegitimizing the jihadist propaganda that is flooding the Internet.

The second objective of the plan is to strengthen the position of our allies and partners in their counterpropaganda efforts. Our regional Muslim partners, who are in the best position to speak for a version of Islam not built on the violent traditions of the religion or the martial parts of the Koran, are usually too busy fighting jihadis on their own territory to respond to jihadist propaganda. Yet there are hundreds of brave men and women across North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia who, at risk to their

lives, are arguing on the Internet against the seventh-century version of Islam that groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State represent. The United States must redirect some of its resources from purchasing weapons and hardware to the covert funding of the information warfare campaigns of friendly Muslim governments and private initiatives. Fewer drones, more psychological operations. During the Cold War, America established publishing houses in Europe with CIA funds, and it needs to do so again against a new foe.

2. Take a step back: help others fight their own wars

Afghanistan and Iraq should have taught us the folly of "nation building." What does work, however, as we learned in El Salvador and Colombia, is what the Green Berets call "foreign internal defense." Instead of our soldiers' being the face of a war against an insurgency, we help other governments fight their own fight. We must reverse the decision made in 2011 to withdraw all our forces from Iraq, but our military should help the people of Iraq learn how to win by themselves.

The best use of our soldiers, Marines, and special operations units is as trainers and advisors to the governments that the Islamic State wishes to take down next. By embedding our junior officers and NCOs down to the brigade level within the armies of the most imperiled nations, supplying them with new technological tools, relevant intelligence, and modern methodologies of war, we can enable them to be the Muslim and Arab face of any victory over the fundamentalist jihadi Muslims.

This does not mean, however, that we have no role to play in directly engaging with the enemy. Our most precious units, such as those of the Joint Special Operations Command, can and should be used to locate and kill the worst of the worst at the highest levels of the jihadist movement. But such operations should represent only a fraction of our military's role, which must be secondary and indirect.

In the final analysis, this is a war within Islam in which the fundamentalists also wish to eventually kill us. But we will win only when those Muslims who wish to be our friends are able to fight and destroy the jihadists.

3. Winning the war at home: education and human intelligence

The year 2015 was the deadliest for jihadist plots and attacks in America since September 11, 2001. We are losing this war both in the

Middle East and on the streets of the United States. There will be more attacks like those in Boston and San Bernardino unless we change the way we think about the threat to the homeland.

There is no such thing as "lone wolf" terrorism. All jihadists are connected to the global jihadist movement by their shared ideology. It is irrelevant that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi himself did not direct Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, to kill Farook's colleagues at their office Christmas party. The point is that Malik praised the new caliph and then swore allegiance to the Islamic State online. The enemy's center of gravity is the ideology of holy war against the infidel, be he a Yazidi in Syria or a Christian in Boston.

The current U.S. policy of focusing domestic efforts on counter-radicalization of individuals before they become terrorists is utterly backward. In World War II, we did not try to dissuade individual Germans from joining the Waffen-SS. We had to destroy "Hitlerism" and all that it stood for. Unless the ideas of the enemy are delegitimized, he will always find more recruits.

Until the national counterpropaganda campaign succeeds, there will still be persons in this country who find meaning in the life of a jihadi and who will target their fellow Americans. In order to stop them, we will need to establish a nationwide program of education and training in the enemy threat doctrine of global jihadism across the armed services as well as federal, state, and local police forces and the intelligence community. All national security professionals must understand what the jihadists believe, what they wish to achieve, and how they propose to achieve it.

We should also apply the New York Police Department's model of counterterrorism intelligence across the federal government. After the horrors of September 11, the NYPD decided never again to rely solely upon federal intelligence about terrorist threats. Under forward-thinking and risk-taking leaders, the city built a world-class counterterrorism intelligence capability, and instead of relying upon machines and technology, built it upon people.

In the war against an irregular enemy like the Islamic State, technology is useful but insufficient. Jihadi networks are built face to face in quiet backrooms as much as in cyberspace, if not more. These networks can be identified and penetrated only by other human beings, human beings who

understand the cultures of those involved and speak their languages. We Americans adore our technology, and it does have a distinct role to play in today's war, especially on the Internet. But the most important element of this fight, as in all wars, is the human element. The Internet is nothing to the Islamic State without the human authority, the leader, the theologian, or the scholar who can use that platform to propagate his very human message of honor and salvation. The federal government must look closely at what New York's Finest have achieved and replicate their human intelligence success across the nation. Only then will we be able to identify and neutralize the next Malik and Farook or the next Tsarnaev brothers before they attack.

AFTERWORD

WHAT CAN *YOU* DO TO HELP DEFEAT THE GLOBAL JIHADISTS?

You don't have to be a member of Delta Force or an intelligence analyst deep in the bowels of the CIA to be part of the effort to defeat the global jihadist movement. Every American citizen has a mission to execute if we are to win this war.

The most important contribution you can make, whatever your "day job" happens to be, is to be an educator. First educate yourself. Then educate your family members. Then broaden the circle and educate your friends, your colleagues, and even your neighbors.

This book is just a primer on why global jihadists are an existential threat to America and what we must do to defeat their brand of religious totalitarianism. There is much more we need to know as a nation about what 9/11 really means and what kind of enduring and robust threat Al Qaeda and the Islamic State represent to the Republic.

The lack of fundamental knowledge is still far too prevalent. Even within professional national security circles, I regularly encounter utterly basic questions like "What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Islam?" and clichéd conspiracy theories like America's having "created" Al Qaeda. Such woeful ignorance might have been excused back in 2002 or 2003, but we are now in the fifteenth year of this war. If we don't do better, we will be doomed to repeat the "whack-a-mole" approach to the threat, provoking greater problems instead of applying the right strategies now.

You the reader can help get us to the point where we know enough about our enemy to point local, state, and national policy in the right direction. Where to start? In the section that follows, I offer the bare essentials—a list of the most important works you should read and the most relevant websites that you can rely on to keep on top of the latest developments. But first, give yourself a refresher course on who you are and what America is, just as Paul Nitze did at the beginning of NSC-68. Read the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. They represent the America the jihadists wish to destroy. These documents enshrine the eternal truths that the Founding Fathers recognized must be the bedrock of the United States of America. Only when we refresh our understanding of where we came from and what America means will we be fully equipped to restore our families' and friends' devotion to what so many of us have forgotten in recent decades.

For example, our Constitution's separation of church and state never meant that religion could have nothing to do with the governing of our nation. The Founders simply intended that the United States would not have an established state religion and that no one could be sanctioned by the state for being of the wrong faith. Separation of church and state does not mean, as many people inside government believe today, that religion can never be discussed when investigating a threat or interrogating a suspect. And it definitely does not mean that a subject under surveillance as a threat to American lives cannot be recorded or otherwise monitored when he steps into a mosque. If someone is suspected of being a terrorist, it matters not whether he steps into a mosque, a church, or a temple; he is still a threat and should be treated as such.

Nor does separation of church and state mean that we cannot identify the religious motivation of a terrorist. If a man says proudly that he is a jihadi and that he has committed an act of violence in service to his faith, it is unconscionable for a politician to insist that the attack had nothing to do with religion, as the mayor of Philadelphia did after the attempted assassination of one of his policemen in January 2016. That is political distortion of the threat. If we understand how politics has perverted the practice of national security in recent years, we will be one step closer to diagnosing the actual threat to America and arriving at the correct response to that threat.

If we return to the principles enshrined in our founding documents, we will also defuse the hoary accusation that talking about "jihad" or "Islamic extremism" is promoting a war between Islam and Christianity. The simple and rather disarming reply to this accusation is that most of the jihadists' victims are other Muslims. The question is whether the values of the people in question are opposed to the nonnegotiable values of our Constitution. If they are, it matters not one iota whether they are communists, fascists, or jihadis. They are all a threat to our way of life. This is not about "freedom of religion" or a war between religions. It is a war between America and anyone who threatens American values.

On a more operational level, all Americans need to understand and accept the reality that they are now on the front line of a war with an enemy that cannot be negotiated with or rationally deterred. This war's battles are not simply fought on the streets of Fallujah or in the caves of Tora Bora. They are being waged here in America—on the streets of New York and Boston, at naval installations in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and on army bases in Texas.

As I hope I have made clear, the jihadists want to kill infidels here in America as much as they want to purge the "impure" from the territory of the caliphate they have established in the Middle East. This means that you, your loved ones, and your neighbors and colleagues are all potential targets of terrorist attacks here in the United States, and you should prepare accordingly.

If you believe you have the requisite mental fortitude and your local government permits it, consider applying for a concealed-carry permit. But do so only if you are prepared to spend the time (and money) for the training that goes with the heavy responsibility of carrying a gun in public. A gun is just a tool—nothing more, nothing less. Without the necessary training and mindset, it can be more a danger to the innocent than an asset to you and yours.

Even if you are not comfortable with legally carrying a weapon, you still have a role to play in this war. As we have seen, jihadists are not random in their actions. They follow a strategy laid out by the likes of Qutb, Azzam, and Malik, and they use tactics learned from jihadist publications such as *Inspire* and *Dabiq*. Terrorists prepare their attacks. They often take months, sometimes years, as in the case of the 9/11 attacks, to gather

information on their targets, to surveil and understand patterns of life and security protocols before they finalize their plan and move into the final phase of an operation. It is not enough simply to engage them with force once they have initiated their attack. Often it will be too late, especially when they use covert means, such as the pressure-cooker bombs employed by the Tsarnaev brothers to attack the spectators of the Boston Marathon. It is far better to catch them in the act of collecting the intelligence they need to prepare their plan of attack.

All our citizens, therefore, should walk through life in a deliberate manner focused on what is happening around them, looking for that which is odd or out of place, as opposed to just staring at their mobile phone. This is not about being afraid but about being aware, of having your "head on a swivel," as peace officers like to say. Take the motto "See something, say something" seriously. Do not be afraid to tell the local police if you notice something untoward—a person filming a building that is obviously not a tourist attraction or neighbors performing activities in their garage late at night with groups of strangers. If the locals of San Bernardino had acted when they saw similar behavior from the jihadi couple responsible for the Christmas party massacre in December 2015, that attack may have been thwarted. Be tactically aware and you may save lives.

OUTLINE OF A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT

The president who succeeds Barack Obama will have to face a global jihadist movement that is stronger than ever. He or she will need to "hit the ground running" if Americans are to be kept safe and our allies and partners strengthened. Hoping that a new administration may decide to take the threat seriously, I have condensed the main conclusions of this book into short points that you can use to evaluate candidates for public office.

The Zero Phase

For Americans to properly understand the threat of global jihad, the politically motivated censorship of government analysis, training, and education must end. The White House must scrap the arbitrary rules about

what materials can and cannot be used to educate our warfighters, our analysts, and our FBI agents about the jihadist threat. Each department, armed service, or unit should once again be allowed to employ and consult the experts and materials it deems necessary based upon objective standards of expertise.

At the same time, Washington must resist the continuous lobbying and subversive tactics of groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, which purport to represent the Muslims of America but do not. These groups use the tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood—CAIR was even classified as an unindicted coconspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial, the biggest terrorist-financing case in U.S. history—to make honest discussion of the jihadi threat impossible inside government. They convinced the Obama administration to purge inconveniently candid trainers and training materials and helped establish "violent extremism" as the official label for jihadist terrorism, an act of misdirection meant to weaken our ability to identify and defeat the threat.

The new administration should collaborate with those members of Congress who have already drafted legislation to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, as other nations far more familiar with the Brotherhood, including the United Arab Emirates and even Egypt, have done. The Brotherhood is the progenitor of twentieth-century jihadism. It needs to be recognized as such, and its formal designation by America as a terrorist organization is a necessary but not sufficient step in winning this war.

At the same time, there must be a complete reappraisal of U.S. policy toward the theocratic regime in Iran. Unless conditions for Iranians inside that dictatorship improve and the mullahs reject their "death to America" stance, sanctions should increase instead of being lifted, and the regime should be further isolated, not embraced.

Once we have recognized the reality of the threat and removed politics from the practice of national security, we can take concrete measures effectively to protect the Republic and defeat ISIS and Al Qaeda where they are strongest. These steps would include the following:

Domestic Measures

- Reinstate and expand the federal human intelligence counterterrorism methods pioneered by the New York Police Department after 9/11.
- Build a curriculum on the enemy threat doctrine of global jihadism that all local, state, and federal law enforcement officers and analysts must be trained in, and fund such training through the Department of Homeland Security.
- Do the same for the Joint Professional Military Education system used across the Defense Department, with short courses for all ranks and grades, and long courses at our academies and war colleges.
- The Department of Defense and the intelligence community must hire subject-matter experts on Islam and jihadist ideology to inform threat analysis and advise theater commanders, including Theater Special Operations Commands.

International Measures

- The policy elite and the Defense Department should once and for all reject counterinsurgency operations as an option to defeat jihadism. Documents such as FM 3-24, the official counterinsurgency handbook, known as the "Petraeus Manual," should be recognized for what they are—rehashed collections of best practices from French and British colonial operations. America is not a colonial empire. The idea of forcing our political model upon others through the use of force is fundamentally un-American (and wholly unrealistic).
- Return our special forces to their original missions of direct action, the targeted killing of enemy leaders, and foreign internal defense, the indirect assistance and training given to regimes that have a modicum of the requirements for success (as in El Salvador during the 1980s and Colombia in the 1990s and 2000s). We should be in the business of direct action and foreign internal defense, not counterinsurgency.

- Use our military to provide the "spine" of a regional response to ISIS. Embed our soldiers and Marines in the national units of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, right down to the brigade level or lower, so as to provide the central core around which an international force can move out to destroy ISIS (and the like), with the frontline fighters being our Sunni allies, not American servicemen.
- Initiate a strategic counter-messaging campaign from the White House itself, modeled on the Active Measure Working Group of the Cold War. Use this new interagency organization publicly to identify jihadi propaganda and the extent of the lies of groups like ISIS, starting with their professing to be fighting for Islam against the infidel while killing more Muslims than any other target group.
- Provide large-scale financial and technical support to our partners best suited to continue this campaign in theater, especially the Jordanian and Egyptian governments.
- Initiate a billion-dollar covert psychological warfare campaign to support Muslim reformers across the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa in their ideological war to delegitimize the message of holy war against the infidel and bolster modern interpretations of Islam.

If these or similar measures are taken soon after the next president takes office, we will be able to win the war against global jihadism.

RESOURCES AND FURTHER READING

Even with a new commander in chief and the implementation of an effective strategic response to the threat of global jihadism, victory in this war is unlikely to be swift. It is therefore incumbent upon all who cherish the liberty that democracy recognizes and protects to educate themselves and keep abreast of the latest developments in this ideological war.

Here is a short list of reading materials and other resources that will help the active citizen better understand our new enemy and allow him to educate his family, friends, and colleagues.

WEBSITES AND ORGANIZATIONS

TheGorkaBriefing.com

I aim to post all my publicly accessible materials on my own website, The Gorka Briefing, as soon as they become available.

Here you will find all my media interviews, lectures, and analyses, including clips from my regular appearances for Fox News, the Fox Business Network, WABC's *John Batchelor Show, Sam Sorbo Show, Lars Larson Show,* and others.

My site also includes unique video lectures on important aspects of the global jihadi movement, including a series on the rise of the Islamic State and what the ISIS threat to America really is, as well as free PDF versions of the key jihadi texts discussed in this book.

Sign up at The Gorka Briefing to receive regular updates on what the enemy is doing and what it means to you and the Republic.

ThreatKnowledge.org

If you are a national security professional—a local peace officer, a first responder, an intelligence analyst, or a uniformed member of our armed forces—you will want to visit and bookmark the Threat Knowledge Group (TKG) website.

TKG is the company my wife and I created after we started to receive more and more requests to support national security professionals across the United States. With our team of experts in all areas of counterterrorism and irregular warfare, we are constantly on the road briefing local units and agencies on the latest developments in the domestic and international threat environment.

Use this website to access our unclassified reports on the Islamic State and other terror groups or to request a special briefing for your own organization or unit.

CouncilonGlobalSecurity.org

The global jihadist movement came out of the Middle East. Born in the minds of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues like the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and refined by the likes of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, the movement still finds its most fertile soil in this area and the broader region of North Africa and South Asia.

The Council on Global Security (COGS) is a not-for-profit foundation run by my wife, Katharine Gorka, that is focused on monitoring and understanding the evolution of the totalitarian ideology of global jihadism and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in undermining democracy both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

If you work in the national security sector, or simply want to know more about how the philosophy of jihad is growing and spreading to new areas, you will want to visit the council's website regularly and also subscribe to the COGS distribution list. Start with my wife's paper explaining how the Obama administration's policies are built upon fallacious analyses and prejudices. It is titled *The Flawed Science Behind U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy* and is downloadable for free at http://councilonglobalsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Flawed-Science-Behind-US-CT-Strategy.pdf.

www.Westminster-Institute.org

One of the greatest untold stories of the post-9/11 world is the systematic killing and persecution of religious minorities by jihadist groups. The Western media, concentrating on the shocking attacks in European and American cities, tend to ignore the massacres and enslavement meted out in those regions where jihadist groups are ascendant. The plight of ancient Christian communities like the Copts and Assyrians, of the Yazidis of the Middle East, and of the Christians of West Africa deserves much greater attention in an age when crucifixion and sex-slavery are once again tools in a religious war.

The Westminster Institute of McLean, Virginia, is a not-for-profit foundation whose mission is to highlight the suffering of these minorities at the hands of new totalitarians such as the Islamic State and to advocate upon their behalf within NGO and policy circles here in America.

Visit the institute's website for studies on the situation in these regions and what it means for religious freedom globally, and consider coming to hear one of their regular guest speakers or watch their world-class lectures online.

The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

Six years before September 11, 2001, before Operation Enduring Freedom, and before the Patriot Act, there was the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).

Under the skillful leadership of Steve Emerson, IPT has become one of the greatest collections on jihadi terrorism anywhere in the world, either inside or outside of government.

Visit www.investigativeproject.org for a treasure trove of concrete information on the plots, organizations, and individuals who are trying to destroy or subvert the United States. Please support this nonprofit foundation if you can.

MEMRI and the Clarion Project

The best way to start to understand groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State is to read and listen to their propaganda.

The English-language Al Qaeda Internet magazine *Inspire* included the recipe for the pressure-cooker bombs used by the Tsarnaev brothers in the Boston Marathon bombing. The Islamic State's magazine *Dabiq* is even more important, detailing as it does the theological reasons for why the caliphate had to be reestablished and why all Muslims must join the jihad against the infidel before the final Judgment Day.

These publications and the associated, often horrifically gruesome, video pronouncements made by jihadist groups are stored and maintained on the websites of the Clarion Project at www.clarionproject.org and the Middle East Media Research Institute, www.memri.org.

Use these sites to familiarize yourself with the beliefs, strategies, and tactics of America's new enemies.

The Al Muslih Foundation

The final victory in the global war against the jihadists will be won by America's Muslim allies, led by statesmen such as King Abdullah II of Jordan and President Sisi of Egypt. When those nations that wish to be our friends and want to live in peace with the West can make their modern version of Islam the dominant version, America will be safer than at any time since September 2001.

Such a victory can come only if brave Muslim reformers have voices louder and more influential than those of the barbaric Islamists. Today there

are already a handful of modernizing thought-leaders across the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia who are aggressively pushing back on the ideology of jihad, often with little or no help from the United States. Al Muslih (the Reformer) Foundation was established to give these voices an international platform. At www.almuslih.org you will find a bilingual collection of some of the most important current writings on Islam, modernity, and democracy found anywhere in the world. If you wish to see a final victory against the Islamic State and its ilk, read and support Al Muslih, the Reformer.

BOOKS

For those who like the feel of paper and cloth in their hands, there are some "old-fashioned" books that are essential reading in this war against the "New Totalitarians."

First, since September 11, 2001, every American should own a Koran. There are no excuses. Every day you can switch on the television or the radio or open a newspaper and hear or read pronouncements about "what Islam is" and "what the Koran says." Most of it is wrong—very wrong. You owe it to yourself, your family, and all the Americans killed on 9/11 and since to know the truth. Do not take anyone's word for it. Find out for yourself by reading the actual Koran. One of the most reliable and recognized versions is the *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary* translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, available at Amazon.com.

Once you have a Koran and start to read it, take care to note the enormous differences between the half reportedly communicated to Mohammed in the beginning in Mecca, when he was weak and without followers, and the latter half, allegedly written after he returned from Medina with thousands of followers, the leader of a mighty military force. It is the post-Medina chapters of the Koran that are naturally favored by groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. They are not in fact "perverting" religious texts but skillfully applying those alleged revelations that best support their cause.

For history buffs with a spiritual bent, there is no better book on where Islam went astray than **Robert Reilly's *The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis,*** from ISI

Books. In fewer than three hundred pages, Reilly, the former director of Voice of America and a former special assistant to President Reagan, explains how the religion of Islam became the victim of a perverted theology that excised natural law and demoted the role of human reason within the faith. The long-term effects of this de-Hellenization of Islam can be seen today in the general development indices of Arab and Muslim nations, and also plays a central role in the renewed strength of the global jihadist movement.

To put all this in the broader context, I strongly recommend any of the works of **Bernard Lewis**, America's greatest historian of the Middle East and the Arab world, but especially one of his shortest works, ***What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response,*** from Oxford University Press.

For a more personal approach to the issues raised by Islam and modernity, I recommend the wonderful books of **Ibn Warraq**. Start with ***Why I Am Not a Muslim,*** from Prometheus Books, before working your way to his more academic texts such as ***Virgins? What Virgins?***

A similarly personal book is **Tawfik Hamid's** ***Inside Jihad: How Radical Islam Works; Why It Should Terrify Us; How to Defeat It,*** from Mountain Lake Press. Dr. Hamid was a medical student in Egypt when he met the future head of Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, and was indoctrinated into the jihadi movement. His story is one from the inside of this pathological worldview, which Dr. Hamid is tirelessly working to undermine.

In this book I have discussed how a secret analysis coupled with a top-secret plan, both from the Cold War, can be reengineered today to defeat the new totalitarian threat posed by groups like the Islamic State. Those who want to go to the next level should read ***Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism,*** edited by **Katharine Gorka** and **Patrick Sookhdeo**. This collection of essays from Isaac Publishing brings together the greatest minds from within the Reagan administration, the people who helped bring down communism, and the best experts on jihadi ideology today. Sharing lessons learned from our victory in the Cold War with the analyses of those who best understand America's ideological enemies today, the book provides more details on how America can win again.

One of that book's contributors, **Stephen Ulph**, ranks as perhaps the foremost expert on Islamic extremism alive today. The founding editor of *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst* and editor of *Jane's Terrorism Monitor,* Ulph recently published his magnum opus on the ideology of Salafi jihadism. Titled ***Towards a Curriculum for the Teaching of Jihadist Ideology,*** the book is available electronically and for free through the Jamestown Foundation. Part one is at www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Ulph_Towards_a_Curriculum_Part1.pdf.

If you want to venture further afield and understand how much the mullahs of Iran represent a Shia version of the Sunni extremism typified by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, there is no better expert than **Dr. Michael Rubin**. His shorter analyses are available, again free of charge, from the American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/scholar/michael-rubin/, but I also recommend his book-length works, starting with ***Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes,*** from Encounter Books.

For an entertaining, if at times depressing, read on how political correctness in the post-9/11 world has attacked the immune system of Western civilization, there is no better book than the British author **Melanie Phillips's** ***The World Turned Upside Down: The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power,*** again from Encounter Books. Her account of how the eternal truths upon which the West was built have been subverted, denied, and usurped in the United Kingdom and Europe should stimulate any American to ensure the same does not happen here.

Lastly, if you want to know just how far and wide the totalitarian ideology of global jihadism has spread, and where it is spreading to next, visit the website of the American Foreign Policy Council.

Under the excellent editorship of **Ilan Berman**, himself a world-class expert on jihadism, the ***Almanac of Islamism*** charts the various movements around the world that share a belief in holy war and gives fascinating details on how they are strengthening their positions in the face of political correctness and ignorance. Go to http://almanac.afpc.org/ for more.

APPENDIX A

KENNAN'S LONG TELEGRAM ON THE SOVIET THREAT TO AMERICA

Here and on the following pages you can read the original secret telegram written at the onset of the Cold War by the American diplomat and Russia expert George Kennan.

In an incredibly frank and clear-sighted analysis, Kennan explains how the behavior of the Soviet Union cannot be understood unless you understand the totalitarian ideology that drives it. This "fanatical" ideology of communism is absolutist and global and will not countenance peaceful coexistence with America or any democracy, exactly paralleling the situation of the United States today, faced by the "new totalitarians" of the global jihadist movement.

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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COPY
ACTION MUST BE ENDORSED
ON ACTION COPY

PEM-K-M
No paraphrase necessary.

8963

Moscow via War

Dated February 22, 1946

Rec'd 3:52 p.m.

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Secretary of State,

Washington.

511, February 22, 9 p.m.

Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(One) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.

(Two) Background of this outlook.

(Three) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(Four) Its projection on unofficial level.

(Five) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. THERE FOLLOWS PART ONE: BASIC FEATURES OF POST WAR SOVIET OUTLOOK, AS PUT FORWARD BY OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA MACHINE, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

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Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972

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-2- #511, February 22, 9 p.m. from Moscow via War

"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."

(B) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(C) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(D) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(E) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(F) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (one) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (two) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or

democratic)

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democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR. These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(G) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to serve interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(A) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(B) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(C) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(D) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

PART TWO

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PART TWO: BACKGROUND OF OUTLOOK

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--- party, secret police and government---and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they

have been

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have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of these premises, every one of which pre-dates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself. Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of western world. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aims.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced west, fear of more competent more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek

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to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which (*) outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This

thesis

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thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question (*) self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth---indeed, their disbelief in its existence---leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers---extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence---this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

PART THREE: Original Retir for P

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PART THREE: PROJECTION OF SOVIET OUTLOOK IN PRACTICAL POLICY ON OFFICIAL LEVEL

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (one) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (two) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (A) to (D) outlined in part one. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(A) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(B) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under communist control, question of Soviet

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base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(C) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal, to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, and to replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which these nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(D) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power.

Latter motive

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Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken western influence among such peoples.

(E) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(F) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in nineteen-thirtys to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviets own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(G) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with super-abundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(H) Beyond

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(H) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners.

PART FOUR: FOLLOWING MAY BE SAID AS TO WHAT WE MAY EXPECT BY WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC SOVIET POLICIES ON UNOFFICIAL, OR SUBTERRANEAN PLANE, i.e. ON PLANE FOR WHICH SOVIET GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS NO RESPONSIBILITY

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

One. Inner central core of communist parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly co-ordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

Two. Rank and file of communist parties. Note distinction is drawn between these and persons defined in paragraph one. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign communist parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--- no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement---are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial

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connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through (*) organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

Three. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, womens organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

Four. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and womens organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital, importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR.

Five. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

Six. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

Seven. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc.

Not only

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Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR.

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized, in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(A) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.,

(B) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of western powers of colonial, backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of western powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(C) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal

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they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage.

(D) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking

(E) Everything

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(E) Everything possible will be done to set major western powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other (*) from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic (*) international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often (*)

(F) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives.

PART FIVE:

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep

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and powerful

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-15- #511, February 22, 9 p.m., from Moscow via War

and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve -- and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(One) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw ---- and usually does----when strong resistance is encountered

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encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige engaging showdowns.

(Two) Gauged against western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmess and vigor which western world can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(Three) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme text of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years after Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additonal strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of communist party than they are today.

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today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--- for the moment---highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(Four) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(One) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(Two) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by fglinness of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people

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Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter of fact basis.

(Three) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiques. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit---Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(Four) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(Five) Finally we must have courage and self confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

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APPENDIX B

NSC-68: THE TOP-SECRET PLAN TO WIN THE COLD WAR

Once America had a clear understanding of the scale of the existential threat the Soviet Union and the spread of communism represented, it fell upon Paul Nitze and his team to provide the plan to defeat the Kremlin and its allies.

Based upon Kennan's superb analysis of Moscow's totalitarian ideology, the top-secret National Security Council document provides the detailed strategy on how to undermine the USSR from the outside by strengthening the Western alliance of nations, and how to weaken it internally so that the ideology would be delegitimized and communism would implode, as it did in 1989.

NSC-68 was declassified by Henry Kissinger in 1975, so we can now read the strategy that defeated our Cold War enemy. I have selected the key parts that have the most relevance to today's new threat of totalitarian jihadists. Note especially in this first part, the passages on page 5 on what America is and what it represents. Clearly Nitze had read his Sun Tsu and knew that to win a war you must first understand who you are, what is at stake, and why you must fight.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

C O P Y

April 12, 1950

Dear Mr. Lay:

After consideration of the Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense, dated April 7, 1950, re-examining our objectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, I have decided to refer that Report to the National Security Council for consideration, with the request that the National Security Council provide me with further information on the implications of the Conclusions contained therein. I am particularly anxious that the Council give me a clearer indication of the programs which are envisaged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost of such programs.

Because of the effect of these Conclusions upon the budgetary and economic situation, it is my desire that the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, participate in the consideration of this Report by the Council, in addition to the regular participation of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Pending the urgent completion of this study, I am concerned that action on existing programs should not be postponed or delayed. In addition, it is my desire that no publicity be given to this Report or its contents without my approval.

Sincerely yours,

(SIGNED)

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:
HENRY A. KISSINGER - ASST. TO THE
PRES. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FEBRUARY 27, 1975
Signature H.C. Date 4-8-75

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
OF JANUARY 31, 1950

April 7, 1950

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# # #

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

> "That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

> "It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R."

ANALYSIS

I. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or nonviolent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency.

The President

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 1, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 68:

Attached hereto is a copy of corrected page 4 of NSC 68. It is requested that this page be substituted for the page 4 now in the document, and that the latter be destroyed by burning.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANALYSIS

I. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions --the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: "...to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

III. FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KREMLIN

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

IV. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF IDEAS AND VALUES BETWEEN THE U. S. PURPOSE AND THE KREMLIN DESIGN

A. Nature of conflict:

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the achievement of its fundamental design. There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self discipline and self restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjegated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Ghandian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism", is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. Objectives:

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.

2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.

3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of theSoviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying

abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our over-all objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in this enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) and quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. Means:

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the

superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

V. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

A. Political and Psychological

The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the U.S.S.R. and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people", (Vyshinski, "The Law of the Soviet State", P. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.

Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these policies is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his own degradation.

The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between

it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. However, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less, - it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents, is unparalleled in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed

totalitariat of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

In this next section of NSC-68, Paul Nitze and his team provide the details of what would become America's "containment policy" to limit the spread of communism around the world, and they roundly reject the option of isolationism as viable in the face of a globally ambitious enemy. Here we can also read what it is that fundamentally separates democracies from

totalitarian systems such as communism that are based on “force, fear and favor.”

Again the parallels with today’s threat are many and various. Nitze warns that “[a] free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excess—the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose.”

VI. U.S. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES--ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

A. Political and Psychological

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength.

As for the policy of "containment", it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations. One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment", the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment". Without

superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"--which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion--is no more than a policy of bluff.

At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R. A diplomatic freeze--and we are in one now--tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a moral ascendency in our struggle with the Soviet system.

In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility for the U.S.S.R. to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.

We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment". In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a by-product of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with ourselves facing difficult decisions.

In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset--capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the negative terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish.

Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society--the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of reason over will--are valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples--our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement and insecurity.

Essentially, our democracy also possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet

system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear and favor. This means that expressions of national concensus in our society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system.

These capabilities within us constitute a great potential force in our international relations. The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence.

These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and our capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of unactualized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet world. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our Allies and to our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible extent.

The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.

The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses--the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.

In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.

The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than compulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something--our native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.

The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world, specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.

Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the Kremlin design. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence and common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world--Western Europe.

As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.

In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own.

Demonstrating an understanding of the subtlety of the threat to America beyond the obvious specter of a nuclear war with the Soviets, this section of the top-secret strategy explains the indirect and nonviolent methods the Kremlin could use to win an ideological war.

Here NSC-68 details how the enemy will use subversion, infiltration, and intimidation to ensure that American institutions no longer serve the

interests of the nation, to “confuse” our culture and political system and “cast dishonor on our country.”

Given what has happened on the continent of Europe in recent years, as well as the recent actions of pro-jihadist front organizations in America, this warning is just as applicable today against our current foe as it was at the beginning of the Cold War.

VII. PRESENT RISKS

A. General

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom. We would face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.

B. Specific

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet ends as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our body politic. The doubts and diversities that in terms of our values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work. Every advantage is taken of the fact that our means of prevention and retaliation

are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely the ones that give our freedom and democracy its meaning for us. None of our scruples deter those whose only code is, "morality is that which serves the revolution".

Since everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed, particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishonor on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus the means by which we sought to restore our own economic health in the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, come equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help the free world was frantically denounced by the Communists in the early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies are equally denounced.

At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and doomed. In local incidents it threatens and encroaches both for the sake of local gains and to increase anxiety and defeatism in all the free world.

The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war. It also puts a premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked. We run all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each.

The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all. For example, it is clear that our present weakness would prevent us from

offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may make any of the critical points which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.

The risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it imparts to our position in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing and being alternately irresolute and desperate; yet it is the cold war which we must win, because both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the first priority.

The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, cannot be accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon Western Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.

But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a general war, or in testing us, may go too far. These are risks we will invite by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.

The concluding sections of NSC-68 provide the possible options open to an America facing the global totalitarianism of the communist USSR. These are: no change in U.S. policies; isolationism; preemptive nuclear war; and, lastly, strengthening the West and containing and undermining communism everywhere. Of the four possible scenarios, only that last is viable and in accord with the founding principles of the Republic.

The top-secret strategy closes by telling the president that the nation and his government must recognize that this cold war is in fact "a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake."

Today with global jihadism growing across the globe, America once more faces an existential and totalitarian threat to all that our nation represents. We can lose this war if we do not recognize that we are in fact at war and that the enemy has a plan to defeat us through subversion or by force if necessary. Paul Nitze's plan worked against communism. We need another NSC-68 to defeat the "new totalitarians" represented by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

IX. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:

a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;

b. Isolation;

c. War; and

d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case, not worse than his fundamental position requires. This is as true in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individuals. The Soviet Union possesses several advantages over the free world in negotiations on any issue:

a. It can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be expected to know more about the realities of the free world's position than the free world knows about its position;

b. It does not have to be responsive in any important sense to public opinion;

c. It does not have to consult and agree with any other countries on the terms it will offer and accept; and

d. It can influence public opinion in other countries while insulating the peoples under its control.

These are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable trend of our power position, they militate, as is shown in Section A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at this time. For although the United States probably now possesses, principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a powerful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to victory in a long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of the United States in the cold war.

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic energy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such evidence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.

Clearly under present circumstances we will not be able to negotiate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What, then, is the role of negotiation?

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.

The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and the terms on which they would be prepared--and at what stages --to accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they must be consistent with a positive program for peace--in harmony with the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the Soviet system would then emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.

A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State could be only a tactic.1/ Nevertheless, concurrently with

1/ The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable security. These were:

1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures in the Far East;
2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite area;
3. Cooperation in the United Nations;

(Continued on following page)

a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms of negotiation.

In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin as the area of possible agreement widens.

The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in human and material resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.

The objectives of the United States and other free countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological objectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the increasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity, it

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1/ (Continued)
4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U. S.;
7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries.

can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforceable or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection and the possibility of effective counter-measures.

This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.

This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.

In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany, Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to participate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of their political and economic life.

This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of negotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer association--on a regional or a broader basis--among the free countries.

In conclusion, negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a settlement can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world domination will be complete. The analysis in the following sections indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and accelerated programs for the carrying out of current policies.

A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying out These Policies.

1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the U.S.S.R., particularly in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war breaks out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to relax its pressures generally or to give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. Political Aspects. The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the incongruity of the current actual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means--in the form of forces in being--to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore,

to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war--on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions--against a Soviet Empire comprising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section B.)

3. Economic and social aspects. As was pointed out in Chapter VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a

tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influence--a "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world domination.

B. The Second Course--Isolation.

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would,even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, because of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from within.)

The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept "peace" on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. The Third Course--War.

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war--in the sense of a military attack not

provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.

These considerations are no less weighty because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter IV is accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the

only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.

D. The Remaining Course of Action--a Rapid Build-up of political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its political and economic problems.

1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U. S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces to attack the enemy and keep him off balance.

The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform certain basic tasks:

a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;

b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory are being built up;

c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;

d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and

e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a built-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war--for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact--the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announce-

ment of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength had been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives--to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition--are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

(1) The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.

(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.

(3) A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to in Section D-1-e.

(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.

(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

(6) Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.

(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.

(8) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.

(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.

(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.

(11) Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross

national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about $65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product ($255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more then the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by $60-$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design

and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which sill support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capebility, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon e decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

"14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.

"15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.

"16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

"a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

"b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United

States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U. S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

"17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

"18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:

"a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.

"b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.

"c. Internal political and social disunity.

"d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.

"e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.

"f. Lessening of U. S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.

"g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics."

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The Analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

"19.

"a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat

to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

"b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U. N. Charter.

"In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

"20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

"a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S.R.

"b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

"c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

"d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U. N. Charter.

"21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

"a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

"b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

"c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

"d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U. S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

"e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

"f. Keep the U. S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt."

* * * * *

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program--harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of

the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the President:

a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.

b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

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Signature Date

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 5, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Actions of the Armed Forces Policy Council at its meeting of 5 September 1950

1. Discussion of NSC-68 (Item #2) (TOP SECRET)

The Secretary suggested, and the Policy Council concurred in, the following time table in connection with the budget for force requirements under NSC 68 (Subject to the approval of the President): The three Chiefs of Staff both individually for their respective Services, and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three Secretaries for each of their respective Services and as the Joint Secretaries, will consider the Service-developed monetary requirements today and will furnish General McNarney and Mr. McNeil their decisions later today (September 5, 1950). General McNarney and Mr. McNeil will then work with the departmental budget officers in refining the budget estimates. A consolidated budget program under NSC 68, approved by General McNarney and Mr. McNeil and by the Chiefs and the three Secretaries will be completed by Monday, September 11, or early Tuesday, September 12, at the latest. Final consideration of this consolidated paper will be the subject for discussion by the Armed Forces Policy Council prior to or on next Tuesday, at 10 A. M. The approved budget program will be sent to the National Security Council at the latest by noon Tuesday, September 12.

No information on the budget estimates will be given to persons outside the Department of Defense pending the final determination of the Department of Defense request. The Secretary requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the detailed budget figures with respect to roles and missions compliance.

Note: Subsequent to the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting on September 5, the Secretary obtained the President's approval of this time schedule.

/s/

Ralph N. Stohl
Secretary of the Armed Forces Policy Council

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
NSC letter, 2-24-75
By NLT, NARS Date 11-7-75

TS 2736

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 14, 1950

NSC 68
A report to the NSC by the Executive Secr. on

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

References: A. NSC 20/4
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 14, 1950

The enclosed letter by the President and the Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense referred to therein are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Council on Thursday, April 20, 1950.

A proposed procedure for carrying out the President's directive as a matter of urgency is being circulated for concurrent consideration in the reference memorandum of April 14.

It is requested that this report be handled with special security precautions in accordance with the President's desire that no publicity be given this report or its contents without his approval.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

HENRY A. KISSINGER - ASST. TO THE PRES. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 27, 1975

Signature H.C. Date 4-8-75

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Economic Cooperation Administrator
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

NOTES

CHAPTER 1: THE LONG WAR

1. For incontrovertible evidence of the duration and depth of these ties, I suggest the sterling work of Tom Joscelyn and his colleague Bill Roggio at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies' inestimable website longwarjournal.org.
2. I was told by the former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld's comptroller, the man who actually signed the checks to pay for the war, that he had been instructed by the secretary to make no budgetary plans for Iraq beyond six months after the fall of Baghdad because by then "Iraq would be functioning as a free and stable nation." I trust this source implicitly and share his horror at such hubris.

CHAPTER 2: THE STORY OF JIHAD

1. ISIS in fact called itself the *Islamic State of Iraq and Al Shaam* before it declared the new caliphate in the summer of 2014. The term *Al Shaam,* bearing great religious significance, has much to do with ISIS's success in recruiting jihadis. But more on that later.
2. Noor Mohammad uses this phrase in his article "The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction," *Journal of Law and Religion* 3, no. 2 (1985).
3. The Arabic word for original ancestor is *salaf,* and this is where we get the word "Salafists." Today, a Salafist is a Muslim fundamentalist who believes true Islam is expressed in living as the original followers of

Mohammed lived, in a theocratic caliphate that combines religion, politics, and jihad, and where the Koran guides all.
4. If one makes that statement in front of Muslim witnesses, one is formally recognized as a member of the global community of Muslims everywhere.

CHAPTER 4: THE ENEMY MASTERMINDS: THE GRAND STRATEGISTS OF MODERN JIHAD

1. It is fascinating to compare this theme of the "inevitability of victory" to Marxist totalitarianism, which took it as an article of faith that communism will destroy capitalism and democracy. All that men must do is choose whether they will join and build the "workers' paradise" or end up on the "ash heap of history."
2. In recent years the phrase "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" has fallen victim to political correctness within the Pentagon. Today it is most often replaced with the new official phrase "intelligence preparation of the environment," lest someone have the impression that we actually are at war. Much the same thing happened when our information warfare professionals at Fort Bragg were told that they will no longer perform "psychological operations" (PSYOP) against our enemies but instead will execute "military information support operations" (MISO). Welcome to the Alice-in-Wonderland world of euphemisms in a time of war.

CHAPTER 5: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? HOW AMERICA WINS AND THE JIHADIS LOSE

1. See the first chart, titled "Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators Since 9/11," in the Charles Kurzman, *Muslim American Involvement with Violent Extremism, 2015* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2016), https://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Involvement_in_Violent_Extremism_2015.pdf.
2. For full details see my presentation to the Marine Corps University, "From Al Qaeda to ISIS: The New Deadlier Face of Jihad,"

http://thegorkabriefing.com/from-aq-to-isis-the-new-deadlier-face-of-jihad/.

3. Any historical insurgent group you examine has one strategic objective: the overthrow and replacement of the government it is fighting. This is true across the spectrum of modern insurgency, from Mao in China after World War II to the FARC in Colombia. ISIS is the first insurgency that wishes to replace all government, not just one government in one country. So far it is winning.
4. Some say that President Obama has chosen to call them "ISIL" and not "ISIS" to avoid a reference to Syria that might remind his audiences of the "red line" he categorically drew with regard to President Assad's potential use of chemical weapons, a red line that in practice had no consequences for Assad's regime.
5. Having made the point, I nevertheless refer to the group in this book as ISIS, the name that is most familiar to American readers.
6. The Arabic acronym of this name is DAESH, the name preferred by our Muslim allies in the region. *Daesh* sounds very much like the Arab word for stomping or stepping on, an act of disrespect in Arab and Muslim culture, and thus an effective insult to the jihadis.
7. Even the magazine's name is part of the End Times theology that ISIS has so proficiently exploited. According to the *Hadith*—Islam's stories about Mohammed—the founder of the faith prophesied that the city of Dabiq, in northern Syria, will be the site of the pivotal battle between the last true Muslims and the forces of the infidel, a battle that would mark the beginning of the Apocalypse. The city of Dabiq is today under ISIS control and part of the new caliphate.
8. To see just how impressive ISIS media products are, look no further than the video released in late January 2016 under the title *Kill Them Wherever You Find Them*. The film opens like a Hollywood action movie, with editing and visuals reminiscent of the television show *Homeland*. Using the latest video animation techniques, Western news footage of the Paris attacks is mixed with images of the British prime minister, the French president, and U.S. naval vessels seen through the targeting sight of a missile or drone. All this before we hear from the eight jihadis who perpetrated the massacre in Paris as they proceed to

execute ISIS hostages. Al Qaeda never made propaganda products of this quality even at the height of bin Laden's fame.

9. Of course, the threat posed by the apocalyptically minded mullahs of the minority community of the Shia will not be trivial if Tehran ever acquires nuclear weapons. But that is a topic for another book.
10. For all the data on what the Islamic State is doing in America, see Sebatian L. Gorka and Katharine Gorka, *ISIS: The Threat to the United States* (Threat Knowledge Group, November 2015), available online at: http://threatknowledge.org/isis-threat-to-usa-report/.

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